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JUDGING HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH: AN APPRAISAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH'S ANALYSIS OF THE AD-DUJAYL TRIAL
Eric H. Blinderman*
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 5, 2006, Trial Chamber 1 of the Iraqi High Tribunal
(IHT) issued its verdict in the Ad-Dujayl trial.1 That verdict convicted Sad-
dam Hussein,2 Barzan al-Tikriti,3 and Awad al Bandar 4 of crimes against
* Eric Blinderman served from March of 2004 until December of 2006 in Iraq, first as an
Associate General Counsel of the Coalition Provisional Authority and later as an Attorney
Adviser, Chief Legal Counsel, and Associate Deputy to the Regime Crimes Liaison's Office.
During his time in Iraq, Eric worked principally with the Iraqi High Tribunal as it prepared to
try and tried members of the former regime, including Saddam Hussein, for atrocities com-
mitted against the Iraqi people. For his service in Iraq, Eric received a Special Commenda-
tion Award from the Attorney General of the United States. Eric has a J.D. cum laude from
Cornell Law School and was awarded an M.St. in international law from the University of
Oxford with distinction. In addition, he has served as a law clerk to a United States Federal
Judge and worked at the United Nations Development Program, the Preparatory Commission
for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, and the Programme in Comparative
Media Law and Policy. He is International Litigation Counsel at the New York office of
Proskauer Rose LLP. The views expressed in this article are based upon the author's experi-
ences and publicly available information that do not violate any privileges or confidences
that may exist between the author and the IHT or the author and the United States govern-
ment. The views expressed herein are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the Department of Justice, the Regime Crimes Liaison's Office, or the United States
government.
1 See John F. Bums & Kirke Semple, The Struggle for Iraq: Hussein is Sentenced to
Death by Hanging, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2006, at Al.
2 On July, 8, 1982, a group of approximately ten individuals attacked Saddam Hussein's
convoy as it traveled through the village of Ad-Dujayl. See Borzou Daragahi, A Tragic Test
Case in Iraq, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2005. In response, Saddam Hussein (then the president of
Iraq) allegedly ordered military units, intelligence operatives, and others to descend upon the
town. See id. Hundreds of people were arrested and detained for years without trial in a de-
sert camp located near the Saudi border. See J. Comm. of Iraqi Intelligence Services and
Iraq's Department of General Intelligence, Minutes ofJ. Comm. Meeting of lraqi Intelligence
Services and Iraq"s Department of General Intelligence, Document IST.A4021.001.053-057
(Dec. 28, 1982) (discussing the transfer of 687 men, women, and children from Ad-Dujayl to
a prison camp located in Muthanna Governorate). Saddam Hussein also referred approxi-
mately 148 men and boys for trial before Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council Court
(RCCC) whereupon they were sentenced to death after a summary trial and executed. See
Memorandum from Saddam Hussein, President, Iraq, to Revolutionary Command Council
Court (May 27, 1984) [hereinafter Referral]; see also Presidential Decree No. 778 from
Saddam Hussein, President, Iraq (June 16, 1984) Presidential Decree No. 778, (June 16,
1984) (Iraq). (IST.A0480.002.002-003) (approving the execution of those condemned to
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humanity inflicted upon the civilian population of Ad-Dujayl following a
failed assassination attempt against Saddam Hussein that occurred there in
1982. Each of these three defendants was sentenced to death. The IHT also
death). In addition, large portions of the town were razed-including the town's orchards-
upon Saddam Hussein's orders.
3 Barzan al-Tikriti was the Director of Iraq's Department of General Intelligence (Muk-
habarrat) in 1982 and supervised the investigation into the failed assassination attempt
against Saddam Hussein. See Memorandum from Barzan al-Tikriti, Dir., Iraq's Gen. Dep't of
Intelligence, to the Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (July 13, 1982). He
allegedly ordered the arrests of hundreds of citizens from Ad-Dujayl and personally partici-
pated in the murder and torture of those who remained in his custody. See John F. Bums,
Defiant Hussein, Lashing Out at U.S., Goes on Trial, N.Y. TuIMfEs, Oct. 20, 2005, at A12.
4 Awad al-Bandar was President of the RCCC. The RCCC was a special court which sat
outside Iraq's regular courts of general jurisdiction and reported directly to the President of
Iraq. See generally INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, IRAQ AND THE RULE OF LAW 109-13 (1994). It
primarily had jurisdiction over cases involving national security and its judiciary consisted,
in part, of civil servants rather than professional judges. Id. at 110-12. According to the
International Commission of Jurists:
Trials before the Revolutionary Court were conducted in camera and defendants
did not enjoy adequate safeguards for their defence, since they were not permitted
to contact their lawyers freely and without surveillance. The Judgements of the
Revolutionary Court were final and could not be contested before any other official
body; they were carried out immediately, except in the case of death sentences,
which were carried out only after their ratification by the President of the Republic.
Id. at 112. On May 27, 1984, Saddam Hussein referred 148 men and boys to the RCCC for
trial as a result of their alleged participation in the failed Ad-Dujayl assassination attempt.
See Referral Memorandum, supra note 2. Approximately two weeks later, Awad al-Bandar
sentenced all those referred to him to death despite the fact that some of the individuals re-
ferred were minors and despite the fact that forty-six had already died during investigation.
See RCCC Decision No. 944/J/1984 (June 14, 1984); see also Death Certificate of Qasem
Mohammed Jasim (Mar. 23, 1989) (IST.A4000.001.007,009,034,031) (indicating that the
individual was fifteen years-old at the time Awad al-Bandar sentenced him to death); Memo-
randum from Counsel of the Revolutionary Command Intelligence Service (Feb. 9, 1987)
(IST.A4019.007.078) (stating that forty-six people who Awad al-Bandar had sentenced to
death in 1984 died during the investigation and interrogation process).
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sentenced Taha Yaseen Ramadan 5 to life, three other defendants6 to a term
of fifteen years imprisonment, and acquitted one defendant 7 of all charges.
On November 20, 2006, Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued a 94-
page report (Report) that analyzed alleged substantive and procedural defi-
ciencies of the first trial before the IHT.8 The HRW Report concludes that
the Ad-Dujayl trial did not meet essential fair trial standards and that the
credibility of the entire IiHT process is doubtfil. 9 Two days later, Trial
Chamber 1 issued a densely worded, single-spaced, 299-page opinion ex-
plaining its rationale for the November 5, 2006 verdict.10
On December 26, 2006, the IHT appellate chamber affirmed the
trial chamber's death sentences in a 17-page written opinion and remanded
back to Trial Chamber 1 the judgment against Taha Yaseen Ramadan with
instructions to increase the penalty against him to death.1" The Iraqi gov-
ernment executed Saddam Hussein on December 30, 2006 and Barzan al-
Tikriti and Awad al Bandar on January 15, 2007.12 On January 25, 2007,
Trial Chamber I reconvened (ostensibly to increase Taha Yaseen Rama-
5 Taha Yaseen Ramadan was the head of Iraq's largest militia-the Popular Army-at the
time of the failed assassination attempt. See Obituary: Taha Yassin Ramadan, BBC NEWS,
Mar. 20, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/not-in-website/syndication/monitoring/media-rep
orts/2333287.stm. He is alleged to have ordered units of the Popular Army to assist Iraq's
intelligence and security forces in arresting citizens from Ad-Dujayl. In addition, Saddam
Hussein purportedly ordered Taha Yaseen Ramadan to destroy the date orchards and palm
trees in Ad-Dujayl in order to punish the town. See Bums, supra note 3, at A12. Taha Yaseen
Ramadan supposedly ensured that Kurdish workers, who the Popular Army protected, ac-
complished this goal and bulldozed the town's palm groves and date orchards.
6 Abdullah Kadhim Roweed, Mizhir Abdullah Roweed, and Ali Diyah Ali were residents
of Ad-Dujayl who assisted the Mukhabarrat and the Popular Army in the campaign of mass
arrest which followed the failed assassination attempt against Saddam Hussein.
7 Mohammed Azzawi was a resident of Ad-Dujayl and had been charged with assisting
the Iraqi government as it arrested citizens from Ad-Dujayl.
8 See generally Human Rights Watch, Judging Dujail: The First Trial Before the Iraqi
High Tribunal, Nov. 20, 2006 [hereinafter HRW Report].
9 See id. at 88-89.
10 AI-Mahkama al-Jina'iya al-'Iraqiya al-'Uliya [The Iraqi High Criminal Court], al-Dujail
Opinion, available at http://www.iraq-iht.org/ar/doc/finalcour.pdf, translated in Grotian
Moment: The Saddam Hussein Trial Blog, English Translation of the Dujail Judgment, Dec.
2006, http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/dujail/opinion.asp.
1 AI-Hay'a al-Tamyiziya, al-Mahkama al-Jina'iya al-'lraqiya al-'Uliya [Cassation Panel,
Iraqi High Criminal Court], al-Dujail Final Opinion, available at http://www.iraq-
iht.org/ar/doc/ihtdf.pdf, translated in Grotian Moment: The Saddam Hussein Trial Blog,
Unofficial English Translation of the Dujail Trial IHT Appellate Chamber Opinion, (Dec. 26,
2006), http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/20070103_dujail appellatechamber
_opinion.pdf.
12 See Marc Santora et al., Witness Says He 'Gave Up'-Guilty in 148 Deaths, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 30, 2006, at Al; see also John Bums, Confusion in Baghdad After Reports 2
Hussein Allies Were Hanged, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2007, at A7.
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dan's sentence to death) with three of the five judges of the original panel
either away from Iraq or otherwise absent.13 The IHT adjourned that court
date stating that the defense attorneys had not received proper notice of the
session.1
4
On February 12, 2007, Trial Chamber 1 reconvened with the same
judges five judges who were present on January 25, 2007.15 Despite protests
from the United Nations, 16 the Council of Europe, 17 defense counsel, and
others, Trial Chamber 1 increased the sentence against Taha Yaseen Rama-
dan from life (which the original Trial Chamber had issued) to death.'8 The
IHT Appellate Chamber affirmed this sentence without written opinion on
March 15, 2007.19 Taha Yaseen Ramadan was hung on March 20, 2007
thereby ending the Ad-Dujayl case. 20 The trial chamber judgment, the ap-
pellate chamber judgment, and the executions of Saddam Hussein, Barzan
13 See Associated Press, Death Sentence is Delayed, CINCINNATI POST, Jan. 25, 2007.
14 See id (noting that Judge Ali Al-Kahachi adjourned the Court session scheduled for
January 25, 2007 and moved it to February 12, 2007 "because the... lawyers are not present
in the court because they were not notified"); see also Giovanni Di Stefano, Ex-Iraqi VP
Taha Ramadan Should be Freed or Retried, Jan. 25, 2007, available at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/hotline/2007/01/ex-iraqi-vp-taha-ramadan-should-be.php (stating
that the Iraqi High Tribunal ... has decided to adjourn the case of my client Taha Ramadan.
. because as a matter of law no defence lawyer had 'legally' been notified of the hearing).
15 See International Center for Transitional Justice and Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Re-
verse Dujail Death Sentence for Ramadan (noting that a panel of five judges from Trial
Chamber 1 of the Iraqi High Tribunal held a "less than 30-minute" hearing on February 12,
2007 and increased Taha Ramadan's sentence to death despite the fact the three of the judges
on the panel had not previously participated in hearing evidence against the defendant).
16 See Sinan Salaheddin, Saddam Aide Sentenced to Hang: Court Ruling Comes Despite
Challenge from Arbour Who Called Trial Flawed, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 13, 2007 (observing
that United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, "filed an un-
precedented legal challenge with the Iraqi High Tribunal against imposing the death sentence
on Ramadan").
17 See Interfax, Iraq Executions "Exacerbate Chaos and Violence, Feb. 13, 2007 (noting
that the Council of Europe condemned the death sentence issued against Taha Yaseen Rama-
dan and that "the move undermines the prospects for accord in Iraq").
18 See Damien Cave, Two Markets Bombed in Central Baghdad, Killing at Least 67 and
Wounding 155, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2007, at A9 (noting that the Iraqi High Tribunal ruled
that Taha Yaseen Ramadan "should follow his former boss to the gallows" despite objections
from United States Officials and the International Center for Transitional Justice in New
York).
19 See Taha Yassin Ramadan Loses Appeal on Death Penalty, Mar. 15, 2006, available at
http://www.ictj.org/en/news/features/l172.html; see also Edward Wong & Damien Cave,
US. Troops to Fan out into 100 Garrisons to Secure Baghdad, INT'L HERALD TRIB. Mar. 16,
2007, at 4 (stating that an "Iraqi appeals court ruled Thursday that Saddam Hussein's former
vice-president, Taha Yassin Ramadan, would be hanged in the next 30 days").
20 See Alissa J. Rubin, Former Vice-President to Saddam Hussein Hanged on 4th Anniver-
sary of War, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2007, at A8.
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al-Tikriti, Awad al Bandar, and Taha Yaseen Ramadan were not analyzed or
taken into account in the Report.
This article attempts to address some of the legal and factual inac-
curacies of the Report and to correct them in view of the IRT's issuance of
the trial and appellate judgments and the executions of Saddam Hussein,
Barzan al-Tikriti, Awad al Bandar, and Taha Yaseen Ramadan. The purpose
of this exercise is to ensure that the Report's conclusions can be more thor-
oughly analyzed and so that those who were not in Iraq and did not partici-
pate in the day-to-day operations of the Ad-Dujayl trial can better under-
stand what occurred and the role that the U.S. Embassy's Regime Crimes
Liaison's Office (RCLO)21 played as the trial unfolded.
This article does not opine about whether the Ad-Dujayl trial and
appellate processes comported with international standards as such an
analysis would require significant time and resources that are currently un-
available. Instead, this article limits itself solely to the issues and concerns
raised in the Report. With this limitation in mind, this article will attempt to
address (1) administrative problems specified in the Report and to deter-
mine whether the administrative criticisms that HRW levies against the IHT
are correct; (2) procedural concerns in the conduct of the Ad-Dujayl trial
and whether those concerns are grounded in fact or law; and (3) substantive
concerns regarding the IHT's ability to conduct trials fairly.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE CONCERNS WITH THE IHT
HRW asserts that the IHT is incapable of handling many adminis-
trative tasks competently.22 In particular, the Report states that the IHT De-
fense Office, Security Protocols for Defense Counsel, IHT's Victims and
Witnesses Protection Unit, Court Documentation, and Outreach and Com-
munications Office were inadequate or sub-standard.23 This article will
briefly address each of these administrative areas in turn.
A. HT Defense Office
HRW's discussion and criticism of the IHT Defense Office is
largely inaccurate. In fact, the IHT's establishment and support of a func-
21 The President of the United States established the RCLO on May 13, 2004 to assist and
advise the IHT as it tries members of the former regime for gross atrocities inflicted against
the Iraqi people. See National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD 37 (May 13, 2004). The
RCLO is headed by a regime crimes liaison, (and until recently) two deputies and a chief of
staff. It has attorneys, investigators, security experts, and administrative staff (primarily
based out of the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad) who advise the IHT on all matters associated with
the IHT's operation.
22 See HRW Report, supra note 8, at 13-14.
23 See id. at 12-36.
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tioning and capable IHT Defense Office is a relative bright spot in the IHT
process. By way of background, the IHT Defense Office was established
pursuant to Rule 30 of the IHT Rules of Evidence and Procedure "for the
purpose of ensuring the rights of accused., 24 The IHT Defense Office is
tasked, in part, with providing advice and assistance to "accused persons
before the ... Tribunal. 25 Pursuant to Rule 30(1), the IHT Defense Office
is managed by an Iraqi defense attorney who serves for a period of three
26years.
In addition, the IHT Defense Office maintains a staff of nine other
qualified defense attorneys (in addition to the director)-all of whom (in-
cluding the Director) were assigned as stand-by counsel to a particular de-
fendant as the Ad-Dujayl trial moved forward and as the threat of boycott
by privately retained counsel became imminent. The IT also recognized
the need for international advisers to assist the IHT Defense Office and, on
February 20, 2006, appointed an international adviser (pursuant to Rule 21
and Rule 30(6)(a) of the IHT Rules of Evidence and Procedure and who
commenced working with the IHT in mid-April of 2006) with many years
of substantive international criminal law experience to advise the IT De-
fense Office in complex international legal and other matters.27 Despite the
qualifications of the IHT Defense Office International Law Adviser (De-
fense Law Adviser)-which included graduating summa cum laude from his
undergraduate university, obtaining a post-graduate research degree from
the University of Oxford, obtaining a law degree with a specialization in
public international law and international criminal law with honors, a PhD
in the field of the law of armed conflict, and working for the war crimes
section of his national Department of Justice, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the
United Nations in various capacities as a lawyer, investigator, and human
rights officer-HRW mistakenly asserted that the Defense Law Adviser
"was not a lawyer., 28
Because of the Defense Law Adviser's extensive experience in the
field of international criminal law, the IHT Defense Office attorneys, al-
though lacking international criminal law training themselves, were able to
work closely with their adviser to represent each defendant capably on the
evidence and law. A particularly telling moment of the partnership between
24 IHT R. EVID. & P. 30(1).
25 Id. R. 30(2)(C).
26 See id. R. 30(1).
27 See Letter from Jamal Mustafa, President, Iraqi High Tribunal (Feb. 20, 2006) (on file
with author).
28 HRW Report, supra note 8, at 34.
[Vol. 39:99
JUDGING HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
the Defense Law Adviser and the IHT Defense Office attorneys occurred
when the privately retained attorneys for most of the defendants refused to
present closing statements on behalf of their clients. In accordance with the
IHT Statute and the IHT Rules of Evidence and Procedure, a slight and di-
minutive IHT Defense Office lawyer-who had been assigned to represent
Saddam Hussein in the event that his privately retained attorneys proved
unable to fulfill their duties-read a closing statement for Saddam Hussein
on July 26, 2006.29
What made this moment important for the IHT and for the IHT De-
fense Office was the fact that Saddam Hussein (immediately prior to the
issuance of the closing) stood up and challenged the lawyer-declaring that
he did not want this closing statement read and that, if the defense attorney
proceeded to read this statement, he would be considered a personal enemy
of Saddam Hussein and an enemy of the state of Iraq. 30 At the same time,
the Defense Law Advisor was denounced by Saddam as an American spy,
presumably on the strength of misinformation provided to that defendant by
his retained counsel. Despite these threats, the Iraqi defense attorney pre-
sented an intelligent and cogent legal argument on behalf of Saddam Hus-
sein (prepared with the assistance of the Defense Law Adviser and which
cited relevant international law precedents) so that Saddam Hussein's rights
would be protected.
HRW challenged this closing statement as well as the closings of
other unrepresented defendants as somehow unfair because they were
drafted with the assistance of the Defense Law Adviser (who according to
HRW was not a lawyer even though he graduated from law school with
honors), translated from English into Arabic, modified by the IHT Defense
Office lawyers and presented in open court for the benefit of each defen-
dant.3' HRW stated that this procedure somehow "indicat[ed] the underlying
lack of capacity among the Defense Office lawyers themselves. 32 This
criticism completely misses the mark. Whether the lawyers had the capacity
themselves to prepare such a closing independently is irrelevant to the over-
all fairness of the Ad-Dujayl trial. The IHT Statute and IHT Rules of Evi-
dence and Procedure presume that Iraqi criminal defense lawyers (like the
judges and other participants in the trial process) would require assistance
with complex issues of international criminal law.33 That is why the Rules
29 See Timeline: Saddam Hussein Dujail Trial, BBC NEWS, Dec. 4, 2006, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/4507568.stm.
30 See Thinner Saddam Still Packs a Punch, BBC NEWS, July 26, 2006, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/5218514.stm ("Saddam Hussein objected to the court-appointed
lawyer, describing him as his enemy.").
31 See HRW Report, supra note 8, at 32.
32 Id.
33 See lHT R. EVID. & P. 21, 30(6).
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of Evidence and Procedure permitted the IHT to retain the services of an
international law adviser who could fill this role.34 In addition, the Defense
Law Adviser fulfilled his ethical and professional duties with integrity by
working day and night with each IHT Defense Office attorney to ensure that
all defendants were capably represented.
Rather than indicating a lack of capacity, the carefully managed
partnership between the Iraqi IHT Defense Office attorneys and the Defense
Law Adviser ensured that the fundamental and basic rights of each defen-
dant (including but not limited to their right to have a closing statement ade-
quately prepared on their behalf) were protected. Both the Defense Law
Adviser and the HIT Defense Attorneys should be credited for their work as
opposed to criticized. And the crux of HRW's criticism regarding the IT
Defense Office (i.e., that the HIT Defense Office lacks the capacity to
mount defenses in international criminal law cases) 35 continues to get re-
dressed as the IT Defense attorneys work with the Defense Law Adviser
to review case law (ten thousand pages of case law from the ICTY, ICTR,
Special Court for Sierra Leone [SCSL], and International Military Tribunal
[IMT] was translated from English into Arabic and presented to all mem-
bers of the IHT); undertake targeted training in cross-examination, interna-
tional law, and other relevant matters; and work closely to develop defenses
for their clients that properly apply the law to the facts.
Similarly inaccurate is the criticism that the IHT Defense Office
"does not provide logistical, administrative, or other support to privately
retained defense lawyers. 36 In fact, the Defense Law Adviser, whose of-
fices contain computers, a conference room, a law library with Arabic and
English materials, full and accurate copies of the Ad-Dujayl and Anfal in-
vestigative dossiers for all defense attorneys (private and public), worked
almost as closely with the privately retained attorneys as he did with the
public attorneys. Indeed, the HIT Defense Office and the Defense Law Ad-
viser facilitated the release of exculpatory documents to privately retained
lawyers, including the release of Awad al-Bandar's full Revolutionary
Command Council dossier to Awad al-Bandar's attorney,37 the transmission
of documents to the IHT, and the overall facilitation (with RCLO support)
of transportation, logistical, and security matters for privately retained coun-
sel throughout the Ad-Dujayl trial.
34 See id.
35 See HRW Report, supra note 8, at 32.
36 id.
37 See Receipt from Defense Attorney for Awad al-Bandar (June 20, 2006) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Receipt from Defense Attorney]; see also infra note 126 and accompany-
ing text.
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HRW fails to acknowledge that the IHT Defense Office and the De-
fense Law Adviser accomplished these tasks despite the fact that the pri-
vately retained lawyers for Saddam Hussein were boycotting the Ad-Dujayl
trial, had issued a letter to the IHT demanding that the Defense Law Adviser
cease working with them, 38 and repeatedly attacked him and specific IHT
Defense Office attorneys in the media.39 When these bullying tactics failed,
they released publicly the names of IHT Defense attorneys on Ba'ath party
websites and released the name of the Defense Law Adviser to the press-
thereby exposing these individuals to threat.4°
HRW states correctly that the IHT Defense Office itself (located in
the same building as the IHT's administrative offices but separate from the
Defense Law Adviser's office) lacks the basic tools for the IHT Defense
attorneys to accomplish their goals. 4' To rectify this problem, the RCLO
made repeated requests to the IHT to refurbish these offices and to provide
the IHT Defense Offices with secretarial support and computer equipment.
When the IHT failed to provide even these basic items to the IHT Defense
Office, the Defense Law Adviser utilized his assets as well as those pro-
vided by the RCLO (including computers, printers, libraries, and other ma-
terials) to work with each attorney so that they could fulfill their duties.
HRW also criticizes the security arrangements made for IT De-
fense Office attorneys.42 With regard to security arrangements for IHT De-
fense Office attorneys, it is important to note that the IHT and Iraq's Prime
Minister's Office located several apartments in the International Zone so
that each attorney could relocate there safely. At first, the IHT Defense Of-
fice attorneys rejected these accommodations because they were smaller or
not as well furnished as their private homes. Only after significant cajoling
did several IHT defense attorneys agree to accept and relocate from their
homes outside the International Zone to these apartments. The remainder of
the IHT defense attorneys had (and still have) access to a secure location for
them and their families inside the International Zone and they remain there
often for weeks on end using the facility's computer, satellite, and Internet
38 See Letter from Khaleel al-Dolami et. al, President, Saddam Hussein Defense Team, to
Judge Ra'ouf Abdul Rahman, Presiding Judge, Trial Chamber 1 (June 13, 2006) (on file with
author).
39 See, e.g., AL SABAH, Jul. 19, 2006 (reporting on criticism about the IHT International
Defense Adviser levied against him by lawyers for Saddam Hussein) (on file with author,
along with multiple other Arabic news reports in which defense attorneys for Saddam Hus-
sein attack the Defense Law Adviser).
40 See id; see also AI-Mahkama al-Jina'iya al-'Iraqiya al-'Uliya [The Iraqi High Criminal
Court], al-Dujail Opinion, available at http://www.iraq-iht.org/ar/doc/finalcour.pdf, trans-
lated in Grotian Moment: The Saddam Hussein Trial Blog, English Translation of the Dujail
Judgment, Dec. 2006, pt. 1, 26, http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/dujail/opinion.asp.
41 See HRW Report, supra note 8, at 33.
42 See id at 33-34.
2006-2007]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
capabilities so that they can live and work in safety until vacant apartments
are located for them inside the International Zone. In short, every single
UIT Defense Office attorney has access to secure permanent and semi-
permanent housing inside the International Zone and the RCLO has repeat-
edly stressed that each and every attorney and their families should utilize
these facilities so that they remain protected.
B. Security Protocols for Defense Counsel
The murders of at least three retained defense attorneys during the
Ad-Dujayl trial were tragic black spots on the entire HT process.43 The loss
of each member of the IHT family deeply impacted the IHT judges, prose-
cutors, fellow defense attorneys (public and private), defendants, and the
RCLO. Even worse, the deaths of at least two attorneys were entirely pre-
ventable.
Specifically, the RCLO (after the killing of Sa'doun al-Janabi-a
lawyer for Awad al-Bandar who was murdered on October 20, 2006) 44 of-
fered each privately retained defense attorney secure housing inside the
International Zone at (depending on the time) a safe house or a specially
constructed defense attorney compound. These housing options (although
far less comfortable than one's private home) were equivalent to the hous-
ing that was initially provided to IHT judges and prosecutors45 and (at least
with regard to the compound) identical to the housing that was provided to
all members of the RCLO. 46 The safe house and compound had 24-hour
electricity, Internet capabilities, a fully functioning dining hall, full access to
the facilities of the Defense Law Adviser (including the conference room,
law library, document repository, and other items described above), satellite
television, hot and cold running water, and other basic amenities to live
safely and to carry out one's work unmolested. Privately retained defense
43 Sa'doun al-Janabi, an attorney for Awad al-Bandar, was abducted from his office in
Baghdad and killed on October 20, 2006. See John F. Burns, Lawyer's Slaying Raises Ques-
tions on Hussein Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2005, at Al. On November 8, 2005 gunmen
attacked Adel Muhammad al-Zubaidi and Thamir Mahmoud al-Khuzaie, attorneys who
represented Taha Ramadan and Barzan al-Tikriti. See John F. Bums, Ambush of Defense
Lawyers in Hussein Trial Kills One, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, at A8. Adel al-Zubaidi was
killed while Thamir al-Khuzaie was wounded and subsequently fled Iraq. Khamees al-
Obeidi, a lawyer for Saddam Hussein was abducted from his home on October 21, 2006 and
executed in Baghdad. See John F. Bums, Hussein Lawyer Seized and Slain in Baghdad Raid,
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2006, at Al.
44 John F. Burns, Lawyer's Slaying Raises Questions on Hussein Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
22, 2005, at Al.
45 Multiple IHT judges and prosecutors lived for approximately two years in a cramped
and dilapidated hotel located inside the International Zone. The hotel often lacked running
water for days and electrical power was sporadic.
46 RCLO staff members resided in trailers that were located inside the International Zone.
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counsel were familiar with the facilities of both the safe house and the hous-
ing compound and resided in these locations during trial days and were al-
ways afforded the option of remaining there indefinitely.
Indeed, RCLO offered permanent housing inside the International
Zone at these locations to privately retained defense counsel at no charge on
numerous occasions after the murder of Sa'doun al-Janabi. RCLO stressed
that, absent permanent relocation to the International Zone, there was no
way the IHT, RCLO, or any other entity could guarantee the safety of pri-
vate defense attorneys who worked with the IHT. In response, international
lawyers working for Saddam Hussein (Ramsey Clark and Dr. Najeeb bin
Mohammed al Nuaimi, in particular) vociferously derided this security
package, claiming-without any experience whatsoever with regard to the
political and security situation outside the International Zone vis-A-vis the
political and security situation inside the International Zone-that relocation
of defense attorneys and their families to the International Zone
ignores the fact that the International Zone includes the Interior Ministry
which the defense believes controls some of the most dangerous deaths
[sic] squads presently attacking persons associated with President Saddam
Hussein, and Sunni's generally .... It also includes command personnel
and elements of U.S. forces which are attacking Sunnis and others opposed
to the U.S. occupation of Iraq .... There is not an area in Iraq with greater
a concentration of hostility and potential for violence against persons asso-
ciated with the administration of President Saddam Hussein and the legal
defense of its leadership than the International Zone. Defense Counsel and
their families cannot be safe in the International Zone.
4 7
Such statements do not reflect the reality of the actual political and
security situation inside the International Zone. Throughout the Ad-Dujayl
trial many Sunni members of Iraq's current government and their families
resided safely inside the International Zone without fear or reprisal. Further,
during the entire course of the Ad-Dujayl trial, not one single attack had
ever been perpetrated against a member of the private IHT defense bar-let
alone any member of Iraq's Sunni population-inside the International
Zone whereas multiple members of the IHT private defense bar and Iraq's
Sunni population had been targeted and killed while living outside the In-
ternational Zone. Most importantly, the International Zone was the only
location inside Iraq where U.S. Marshals, RCLO support staff, and others
associated with the process could provide 24-hour, round-the-clock profes-
47 Emergency Request to the Court to Act to Secure Protection of Defense Counsel, Their
Families, Legal Assistants, Investigators, and Defense Witnesses and to Suspend Trial Pro-
ceedings Until Security is Provided, at 4-5, Iraq Interim Gov't v. Saddam Hussein AI-Majid
(Iraqi High Criminal Court Dec. 5, 2005), available at http://intemational-lawyers.org/
Documents/motion2Dec2005.pdf.
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sional security protections and all the basic provisions needed to live a se-
cure existence.
In view of these concrete realities, HRW's analysis of the defense
counsel security situation (like the analysis of the defense attorneys them-
selves) was seriously misinformed. HRW's Report states "[a] durable solu-
tion to the problem of security for private defense lawyers was not devel-
oped by the court over the course of the Dujail case. ''4 This is false.
The IT and RCLO did develop a durable solution to the problem
of security for private defense attorneys. For private attorneys who traveled
to Iraq from outside of the country, RCLO representatives always facilitated
secure transportation for them (at no charge) to and from the Baghdad In-
ternational Airport and the International Zone. For all attorneys who wished
to remain permanently and safely inside Baghdad with their families
throughout the trial, at least two entirely separate housing facilities inside
the International Zone (a safe house and a secure housing compound) were
constructed, refurbished, and equipped at considerable expense. That the
private defense bar rejected this and chose to remain living outside the In-
ternational Zone with sporadic and untrained security guards as their only
protection cannot form a basis for laying blame at the feet of the IHT and
RCLO for the murders that followed.
C. Victims and Witness Protection Program
The Report's conclusions with regard to the IHT's Victims and
Witness Protection Program are partially correct.49 For example, the Report
is correct in observing that the IHT failed to take long-term administrative
steps that might have better ensured the safety of witnesses who testified in
the Ad-Dujayl trial. 50 The reasons for this failure are complicated but re-
volve around a series of hard realities that the IHT faces in all of its opera-
tions, and HRW did not adequately factor these realities into the Report.
First, the security situation in Iraq was and remains tenuous with car bomb-
ings, kidnappings, and summary execution of residents in many areas of the
country being common occurrences. As such, the IHT's limited resources
for protective measures were often spent on judicial officers, defense coun-
sel, prosecutors, and their immediate families in the first instance, rather
than on victims and witnesses.
Second, the security apparatus created by the IHT to protect those
involved in the IHT process was often spread thin and ineffective. And
when provided, IHT staff (including judges, prosecutors, and-as already
discussed--defense counsel) failed to follow basic guidance on force pro-
48 See HRW Report, supra note 8, at 23.
41 See id. at 14-17.
50 See id. at 16.
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tection and other matters despite security recommendations provided by
U.S. advisers.5l During my tenure in Iraq, an investigative judge and his son
were killed, as were family members of the lead prosecutors for the Ad-
Dujayl and Anfal trials, the brother-in-law of the chief judge to the Anfal
trial, and the brother of a defendant in the Anfal trial.52
Faced with such violence, the IHT moved many of its staff mem-
bers and their immediate families into the protected International Zone, but
budgetary, logistical, and other constraints prohibited the IHT or the RCLO
from making any long term plans for victim and witness safety other than to
provide safe transport to and from the IHT during trial days and to provide a
secure location (separate from the locations that were provided to defense
attorneys) for victims and witnesses to reside inside the International Zone
immediately before and after they testified. It was not that the IHT or RCLO
were blind to the needs of an adequate victims and witness protection pro-
gram. Rather, the IHT and RCLO were faced with a constant triage mental-
ity. Those closest to the process such as judges, defense counsel, and prose-
cutors were offered the most immediate and robust security packages as
they faced the most imminent threat while those one step removed from the
process were provided lower levels of protection.
These lower levels of protection permitted witnesses to testify from
behind a closed curtain and to refrain from having their identities disclosed
to the public. In other words, each witness was informed of their right to
testify publicly or to shield their identity from public disclosure. IHT,
RCLO, and U.S. Marshals met with each witness prior to testifying in order
to determine whether the witness would testify in public or whether his or
her specific security needs required shielding his or her identity from public
disclosure. Given that each witness and victim who testified for the prosecu-
tion was from the city of Ad-Dujayl, given that Ad-Dujayl was a mixed
Shiite and Sunni city in the heart of Iraq's Sunni population, and given the
fact that sectarian violence in the city of Ad-Dujayl and neighboring Balad
51 For example, the U.S. Marshals agreed to fund an intensive training program for each
IHT judge's and prosecutor's personal security detail. Despite this offer, not one single
member of the IHT accepted it and agreed to have their security detailed professionally
trained.
52 See Robert F. Worth, 2 From Tribunal for Hussein Case Are Assassinated, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 2, 2005, at Al, A8 (describing how investigative judge Parwiz Muhammad Mahmoud
and his son, who also worked for the IHT, were killed in Baghdad); see also Sabrina Tav-
emise & Qais Mizher, Iraqi Linked to Sunni Bloc Is Held in Plot, Military Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 2006, at A6 (stating that "on Friday, Iraqi authorities announced the killing of the
brother-in-law of the judge who is presiding over the trial of Saddam Hussein"); See Michael
Luo, Iraqis Ask Why U.S. Forces Didn't Intervene in Balad, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2006, at
A8 (stating that "the older brother of Munkith al-Faroun, chief prosecutor in the so-called
Anfal trial that began in Baghdad in August, was shot dead by unknown assailants at his
home in the western Baghdad suburb of Jamaa").
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was high,53 most witnesses and victims expressed a desire to testify from
behind a closed curtain with their voices disguised. The IHT readily agreed
to this measure for witnesses and victims testifying in the Ad-Dujayl trial so
long as they exposed their identities to defense counsel immediately prior to
testifying.
HRW criticizes these security decisions as "blanket protective
measures" that violated each defendant's due process rights.54 Yet, nowhere
in the Report does IRW take into account the substantive reality that, ab-
sent such measures, any witness who testified in public would likely have
been murdered or would likely have had family members murdered in re-
taliation for their decision to testify in public. 55 Importantly, HRW also fails
to acknowledge that each victim's and witness's statement was provided to
all defense attorneys on August 10, 2005 so that the substance of all testi-
mony was known many weeks prior to the commencement of trial.
HRW is correct in observing that the disclosed witness statements
were redacted, thereby preventing defense counsel from ascertaining the
identities of the witnesses until immediately before testifying.56 Moreover,
this process may have prevented defense counsel from developing poten-
tially fruitful lines of cross examination with regard to a witness's history
and personal motivations for testifying. That said, the procedure employed
permitted defense attorneys to prepare cross examination with regard to the
substance of any testimony many months prior to the start of trial had the
defense attorneys chosen to do so. In addition, the defense attorneys (if they
concluded that a victim's or witness' particular identity and personal history
was relevant to the credibility of his or her testimony) could have (upon
receipt of a particular witness' or victim's identification papers at trial) in-
vestigated the witness' or victim's background thereafter and sought to re-
call the witness or victim and/or introduced impeachment evidence in the
defense portion of the case.57
53 See Luo, supra note 52 (describing how an "explosion of sectarian violence over the
weekend left dozens dead [in Balad and neighboring towns]").
54 See HRW Report, supra note 8, at 62-63.
55 Notably lacking in the HRW report is the concrete fact that the threat these witnesses
and victims faced came from two sources-members of Sunni militias who might target
them for participating in the IHT process and members of the IHT private defense bar who
might (and actually did) publicize the names of those participating in the IHT process to
those who might do them harm.
56 See HRW Report, supra note 8, at 63.
57 In fact, the defense did exactly this. A complainant in an early portion of the Ad-Dujayl
case testified that there was no assassination attempt against Saddam Hussein in 1982. See
Transcript of Record at 4, al-Dujail Trial, (May 31, 2006) (No. 1) (on file with author) (re-
playing complainant testimony from December 21, 2005 in which the complainant stated that
people refer to an assassination attempt against Saddam Hussein in 1982 "even though it
never was"). The complainant testified that people had fired weapons into the air in celebra-
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The only merit to HRW's Report with regard to this matter rests
upon HRW's statement that the redaction of the witness names from the
investigative dossier resulted in a violation of Rule 41(l)(A) of the IHT
Rules of Evidence and Procedure. 58 According to Rule 41(l)(A), the Prose-
cution was obligated to notify the defense at least forty-five days prior to the
commencement of trial of all the names of witnesses he intended to use to
establish the guilt of the accused.59 Because the IHT redacted the names of
all such witnesses from the investigative dossier, it is likely correct that
Rule 4 1(1)(A) was violated.6°
Although the trial chamber arguably could have created certain ju-
dicial exceptions to this rule (or at least addressed whether the failure to
disclose the names of these witnesses in a timely fashion warranted the de-
lay of trial), it did not. Likewise, the appellate chamber decision did not
address this issue leaving the legal implications of the IHT's redaction of
witness names unresolved. Self-evidently, the defense attorneys in the Ad-
Dujayl trial, who never filed a written motion on this point, failed to pre-
serve any objection they might have over the IHT's decision to redact the
names of every witness from the investigative dossier. And this failure to
raise this issue in writing may, in part, explain why neither Trial Chamber 1
nor the appellate chamber addressed this matter in their opinions. At best,
the Anfal trial chamber, which followed the precedent set forth in the Ad-
Dujayl trial and redacted the full set of witness identities from the referral
file for reasons of witness security, should address this issue so guidance
about the proper use of this technique is provided moving forward. To that
end, the defense attorneys in the Anfal trial would do themselves, and the
IHT, a service if they raised this specific argument in a detailed written
submission to the tribunal.
The more difficult questions regarding victim and witness protec-
tion pertain to the limited world of witnesses who testified publicly during
tion of Saddam Hussein's visit to Ad-Dujayl. See id at 3 (repeating testimony from Decem-
ber 21, 2005, in which the complainant stated that "one of our brethren ... was delighted
with our reception of the President... so [he] fired shots"). The defense was able to locate a
video in which this complainant admitted to having shot directly at Saddam Hussein's mo-
torcade in 1982 as part of a larger assassination attempt. See id. at 4 (playing videotape from
July 4, 2004 in which the complainant states that in 1982 "faithful young men resolved to kill
the tyrant for the salvation of the Iraqi people and the people of the entire region"). Trial
Chamber 1 admitted this video into evidence and took it into account when determining how
much weight to afford this witness's testimony. See id.
58 See HRW Report, supra note 8, at 63.
59 See IHT R. EVID. & P. 41(l)(A).
60 Although this does not mitigate the prosecution's failure to comply with its disclosure
requirements under Rule 41(1)(A), it bears noting again that the defense counsel similarly
failed to comply with their disclosure requirements under Rule 41(l)(D). See infra notes
129-30 and accompanying text.
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the Ad-Dujayl trial. More specifically, the first two witnesses in the Ad-
Dujayl trial confronted Saddam Hussein and all seven other defendants dur-
ing the first few days of trial and appeared before the entire world without
fear and without hiding their names.61 This testimony was powerful and
made an indelible imprint on the course of the entire Ad-Dujayl proceed-
ings. Upon completion of this testimony, these witnesses remained in a safe
location until such time as they decided to return to Ad-Dujayl. When these
witnesses found their personal security situation threatened, they contacted
representatives from the Iraqi government who took special precautions by
providing the witnesses and their families safe housing in the International
Zone and by providing them stipends and employment. Although these two
witnesses and another have expressed a strong desire to relocate interna-
tionally, no country has agreed to accept these individuals and their families
for permanent relocation despite repeated requests to several states on be-
half of these witnesses from the RCLO.
The bottom line is that the procedures that the IHT employed to
protect the vast majority of witnesses and victims did include pre-trial risk
assessment, in-court protective measures based on risk assessments that
RCLO, the IHT, and U.S. Marshals made on a case by case basis, safe
transportation to and from the court and safe accommodation during court
attendance. Unfortunately, post-trial follow-up and threat monitoring was
and still is lacking as is a comprehensive and systematic relocation pro-
gram-either internal to Iraq or internationally.
Whether such post-trial follow-up for all witnesses and victims and
whether relocation agreements for those witnesses and victims who testified
in public are feasible depends very much on the domestic security situation
in Iraq and (with regard to international relocation) the ability of at least one
state other than Iraq to accept these witnesses and victims and their families
as permanent residents. Unless these two factors shift, the IHT's victims and
witness protection procedures (although not perfect from a due process
standpoint or from a protective standpoint) seem inevitable given the need
to balance the lives of those testifying against the security situation in Iraq
and the needs of defense counsel. Tellingly, HRW presents no offers of
assistance or other credible alternatives that the IHT might have used to
protect better the witnesses and victims while ensuring the defendants' right
to cross examine them.
D. Court Documentation Unit
HRW rightly opines that Trial Chamber 1 had difficulty in cata-
loguing and tracking each and every defense motion and document submit-
61 See Robert F. Worth, At Trial in Iraq, Witnesses Tell About Torture, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec.
6, 2005, at Al.
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ted during the course of the IHT trial.62 This was partly due to the fact that
the IHT lacked an effective administrator who could be tasked with main-
taining a professional and competent registry.63 Instead, the IHT relied upon
court clerks who worked with each judge to compile an official record of all
that transpired at trial. Unfortunately, this record (which included all de-
fense motions and other documents) was voluminous and not shared with
the public (including prosecutors and defense counsel) as it remained per-
sonal to the judges.
Moreover, the judges generally refrained from referring to the case
file until such time as the opinion drafting process began. This had the un-
fortunate effect of creating confusion among the judges and other court par-
ticipants as to whether a submission on a particular issue was already before
the court. This problem was exacerbated further as the judicial composition
of Trial Chamber I fluctuated. For example, Judge Rizgar Amin64 may have
62 See HRW Report, supra note 8, at 17-19.
63 Part of the reason for this problem rests on the fact that the IHT was originally named
the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) and contained a separate Administration Department, headed
by an independent Administrator who was responsible for "the administration and servicing
of the Tribunal and the Prosecutions Department." Coalition Provisional Authority Order
Number 48, § 1(1), art. 9, CPA/ORD/9 Dec 2003/48 (Dec. 10, 2003), available at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20031210_CPAORD48IST-and AppendixA.pd
f. The democratically elected Iraqi Transitional Government rescinded the IST Statute and on
October 18, 2005 published a new law-Law No. 10 of 2005-that, in part, amended, re-
promulgated, and restated the IST Statute. See Qanoon AI-Mahkamat Al-Jeena'eyyat Al-
Eraqiyyat AI-Mukhtas [Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal], Oct. 18, 2005, available at
www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/ISTstatute-officialenglish.pdf (Iraq). The IHT
Statute renamed the IST the IHT and (in relevant part) folded the Administrator's powers
into the IHT Office of Presidency-thereby subordinating the authority of the Administrator
to the IHT's President. See id art. 7(l)(D) (stating that the IHT President is responsible for
"[a]ccomplish[ing] the Court's administrative work").
64 Judge Rizgar Muhammad Amin was the first presiding judge of Trial Chamber 1. See
Robert F. Worth, Fed Up, Judge in Hussein Trial Offers to Quit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006,
at A6. He presided over the Ad-Dujayl trial from October 19, 2005 until January 14, 2006,
whereupon he resigned due to public criticism over the way he was managing the trial. See
id.; see also infra notes 199, 227 and accompanying text. Under Iraqi law, Judge Rizgar's
deputy, Judge Sa'eed al-Hamash should have assumed the role of acting presiding judge until
such time as the trial chamber's members met and elected a permanent presiding judge. See
Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal art. 3(4) (stating that each trial chamber "shall be com-
posed of five judges who shall elect a president from amongst them to supervise their
work"); see also Iraq Law on Judicial Organization, Law No. 160 of 1979, art. 14 (Dec. 10,
1979) (stating that "in case of absence [of the President] the senior judge of the Court shall
replace him"); Robert Worth, Ambush Traps Iraqi Patrol; 2 GI. 's Die in Copter Crash, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 17, 2006, at A8 (noting that Judge Rizgar would likely be "replaced by Said al-
Hamash"). This did not happen as Iraq's Higher Commission of De-Ba'athification (HNCD)
issued a letter alleging that Judge Sa'eed al-Hamash was a former member of the Ba'ath
Party and therefore ineligible to serve on the IHT. See Qassim Abdul-Zahra, Saddam Trial
Judge 'Once a Member of the Baath Party, THE SCOTSMAN, Jan. 19, 2006, at 1 (reporting
that the executive director of the HNCD issued a formal letter to the IHT objecting to the
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accepted a particular document and recorded it with his clerk but Judge
Ra'ouf Abdul-Rahman 65 may not have been familiar with the exact sub-
stance of any such submission (including motions or powers of attorney) or
the date it was submitted unless he had recently reviewed the contents of the
clerk's file.
The IHT's lack of a centralized collection point for the receipt and
transmission of court submissions and its refusal to make public the con-
tents of the clerk's files compelled defense counsel to resubmit motions and
powers of attorney that were already included in the court's record and
compelled defense counsel and the IHT to develop ad-hoc systems to ensure
that the court actually considered relevant items. These systems depended
on the judicial practices of the individual judge presiding over Trial Cham-
ber 1 and changed along with the chamber's composition and the fluid po-
litical situation in Iraq's legal system.
For example, Judge Rizgar Amin and Judge Sa'eed Al-Hamash
were comfortable with the receipt and transmission of court documents to
defense counsel using electronic means and during their tenure, Trial
Chamber 1 used email to communicate on a regular basis with defense
counsel. Judge Ra'ouf Abdul-Rahman preferred to receive hard copies of all
documents from defense counsel either immediately prior to the start of a
trial session or in open court and repeatedly cited Iraqi law as requiring this
to occur. Although the Iraqi Bar Association was expected to serve as the
functional equivalent of a centralized after-hours collection point for de-
fense counsel submissions, it supported a defense counsel boycott of the
IHT for several months during the trial66 and was later dissolved.67 These
events effectively limited the Iraqi Bar Association's role in the Ad-Dujayl
Trial and compelled all defense counsel to abide by Judge Ra'ouf's practice
of receiving documents only in court.
possibility that the deputy judge Sa'eed al-Hamash would replace the chief judge and de-
manding the Judge Sa'eed be replaced by a judge without alleged ties to the Baath Party); see
also infra notes 214-18 and accompanying text. In response, the then IHT president (Judge
Jamal Mustafa) transferred Judge Sa'eed to an alternate trial chamber as the De-
Ba'athification process moved forward and appointed Judge Ra'ouf Abdul Rahman as the
presiding judge of Trial Chamber 1.
65 Judge Ra'ouf Abdul-Rahman replaced Judge Rizgar Amin as the presiding judge of the
Ad-Dujayl trial on January 29, 2006. See Robert F. Worth, Hussein Trial Erupts, and Expul-
sions Ensue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2006, at A13.
66 See John F. Bums, Hussein's Lawyers Refuse to Work with Iraqi Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 27, 2005, at A14 (stating that defense lawyers were boycotting the IHT and that the
Iraqi Bar Association was calling for an "end to any involvement with the court...").
67 See Government Says it Dissolved Bar Association, Members Deny It, ASSOCIATED
PRESS WORLDSTREAM, Mar. 6, 2006 (reporting that the Iraqi government "ha[d] dissolved the
Iraq Bar Association, naming a five-member committee to run the organization until elec-
tions for a new board are held").
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HRW's claim that an investigative dossier, exceeding nine hundred
pages, disclosed to defense attorneys on August 10, 2005 was illegible is
not accurate.68 Instead, the Court redacted personal informati6n of various
witnesses to ensure witness and victim safety until such time as trial com-
menced. As noted above, this shortcoming did prevent defense counsel from
pursuing certain avenues of investigation and cross-examination that may
have benefited them but the practical realities of conducting the Ad-Dujayl
trial in a war zone (combined with the IHT's suspicion that certain members
of the defense team were engaged in active insurgent activities against the
government of Iraq) compelled the IHT to withhold this information from
defense counsel until immediately prior to the witness' decision to testify.
Contrary to HRW's statements, the IHT-through the IHT Defense Office
and the IHT's Secure Evidence Unit (SEU) 69-- did repeatedly respond to
defense counsel complaints about illegible or missing documents by scour-
ing the IHT archives for such items and providing them to the privately re-
tained counsel as the trial moved forward.7 °
These facts are critically omitted from HRW's Report as is an even
more critical fact. The Ad-Dujayl referral file was made available to all at-
torneys on August 10, 2005-approximately three months before the Ad-
Dujayl trial started. As of October 19, 2005, the date the trial began, only
several attorneys actually took the time to come to the International Zone,
obtain copies of the file, and review it. To my knowledge, all other defense
attorneys never (throughout the course of trial) picked up the remaining
copies of the Ad-Dujayl file and those copies remain in the WIT's custody
today. Thus, for HRW to claim that the trial's fairness was somehow im-
pacted because of an illegible case file is a bit unfair as the IHT endeavored
to correct and did correct any errors or mistakes in the case file throughout
the trial. It is more correct to state that, although the IHT's decision to re-
dact the file may have impacted the fairness of trial, the majority of the pri-
vately retained defense counsels' decision to refrain from ever reviewing
the file in its entirety, if it all, more deeply impacted the rights of each de-
fendant to a fair trial.7'
68 See HRW Report, supra note 8, at 19-20.
69 The IHT Secure Evidence Unit is charged with preserving any and all evidence received
that is relevant to matters within the IHT's jurisdiction. See IHT R. EVID. & P. 26(1); see
also infra note 125 and accompanying text.
70 See, e.g., infra note 126.
71 Fortunately, the IHT Defense Office had full and accurate copies of the entire Ad-
Dujayl case file and their attorneys worked with the Defense Law Adviser (as described
above) to prepare substantive and procedural defenses based on the evidence and law for
each defendant. See Timeline: Saddam Hussein Dujail Trial, supra note 29 and accompany-
ing text. In addition, the Defense Law Adviser made sure that a full copy of the Ad-Dujayl
referral file was available at his office (which was also located in the same compound as the
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E. Outreach and Communications Office
HRW's analysis of the IHT's outreach and communications pro-
grams is essentially correct. 72 The IHT never embarked on a targeted pro-
gram to educate the Iraqi people (and maybe more importantly-the Iraqi
government) about the mechanics of the IHT process, the need to afford the
defendants proper legal rights, the nature of the crimes being adjudicated
before the IHT, and the reasons why a fair, neutral, and transparent IHT
process was important to the Iraqi people. Instead the IHT's outreach pro-
gram was limited to the appointment of the chief investigative judge as a
public spokesperson, televised coverage of the trials, the creation of an
Internet website that contained perfunctory information and was updated
sporadically, the conduct of irregular press briefings, and the issuance of
press releases at important junctures in the IHT process.
This failure is distressing. Judge Gabrielle McDonald (the first
president of the ICTY) lectured the IHT in October 2004 about the need to
create an effective outreach program and how such a program was created
for the ICTY. Judge McDonald explained that one of the most important
tasks she accomplished while serving as the president of the ICTY was to
ensure that the ICTY's outreach program (which included developing litera-
ture, educational programs, and lectures in various regions of Bosnia, Ser-
bia, Croatia, and elsewhere) became operational and was effective.
The IHT's failure to understand why the creation of a more com-
prehensive outreach program was important to the IHT process exacerbated
many of the institutional and political problems the IHT faced as it moved
forward with the Ad-Dujayl trial. Indeed, as Iraqis (inside and outside of
government) witnessed the Ad-Dujayl trial commence and saw how Judge
Rizgar Amin afforded the defendants the opportunity to cross-examine wit-
nesses directly (as permitted by Iraqi law) 7' and otherwise treated the de-
fendants in accordance with the bedrock legal principle that they were inno-
cent until proven guilty74 (such as by referring to the defendants by name
instead of simply calling them "defendants"), they grew incensed and called
for the IHT to treat the defendants more harshly.75 Tellingly, public discord
with the trial process resulted in several demonstrations in which members
private defense attorneys) so the defense attorneys could review the file even if they never
picked up their own copy.
72 See HRW Report, supra note 8, at 24-28.
73 See Iraq Law on Criminal Proceedings, Law No. 23, 168 (1971) (stating that "the
public prosecutor, complainant, civilian plaintiff, a civil official, and the defendant may
discuss the testimony via the court").
74 See HIT Statute, supra note 63, art. 19(2).
75 See HRW Report, supra note 8, at 24-28.
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of Iraq's Shiite majority called for the IHT to take a tougher stand against
the defendants.76
Of course, public outcry over the trial was not solely a result of a
lack of education with regard to the nature of the IHT process. The defen-
dants (particularly Saddam Hussein) and the defense counsel themselves
deliberately sought to exacerbate the public's discontent with the trial proc-
ess by continuously utilizing their right to examine witnesses as a platform
for repeated and long-winded political diatribes. And Judge Rizgar's failure
to temper the defense counsel's and defendant's tactics with more rigid
courtroom control contributed further to the public's misperception that the
Ad-Dujayl trial was being conducted in a manner that was too lenient on the
defendants.
That said, the IHT would have served itself better by engaging in a
nationwide public outreach campaign in the months leading up to the start
of the Ad-Dujayl trial so that the Iraqi population could better understand
the legal rights granted to each defendant and the specifics of what would
unfold in the courtroom. Doing so might have balanced the climate of re-
venge against the defendants that permeated many sections of Iraqi society
against the IHT's need to dispense fair justice. Such a campaign could have
included educational television programs about the IHT that might have
aired on Al-Iraqia television, the creation of a more robust website, the dis-
semination of literature describing the court process to the various provinces
in Iraq and to the Iraqi government itself, and the establishment of a perma-
nent outreach unit within the IHT to coordinate the IHT's outreach efforts.
Had the IHT conducted such a campaign it is possible (but unknown) that
some of the political pressure that was placed on the court by various sec-
tions of the Iraqi public and the Iraqi government during the Ad-Dujayl trial
may have been lessened.
On a positive note, the IHT and RCLO did create a series of pam-
phlets, brochures, diagrams, and other materials (in Arabic and English) that
were disseminated at the IHT courthouse so that local and international me-
dia representatives might better understand the Ad-Dujayl trial and the IHT
itself. In addition, the RCLO attempted to hire an outreach coordinator to
assist the IHT in establishing a permanent outreach program. Although no
person has yet filled that position, the RCLO anticipates that it will fill this
position shortly. Finally, the RCLO engaged in a partnership with the Insti-
tute for War and Peace Reporting to train local Iraqi journalists about the
complexities of war crimes reporting so that they can better cover the IHT
process as it moves forward. Unfortunately, these RCLO efforts will do
76 See Exclusive Interview With Judge Rizgar Hama Amin, http://iraqikurdistan.blogspot.
com/2006/09/exclusive-interview-with-judge-rizgar.htm (Sept. 11, 2006) ("Shiite parties
organized demonstrations just outside the green zone calling for immediate verdict and hang-
ing of Saddam and his aids.").
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nothing to impact the now complete Ad-Dujayl trial and will not bear long-
term fruit if the IHT itself does not recognize the need for such an outreach
program. It is critical to note too that the RCLO's assets, already under seri-
ous strain, must be supplemented by international actors if the IHT process
(and particularly any IHT outreach program) is to succeed.
III. PROCEDURAL CONCERNS WITH THE IHT
HRW asserts that the IHT failed to handle many procedural matters
related to the Ad-Dujayl trial in a manner that comported with international
standards. The Report states that: (a) the defendants lacked adequate time
and facilities to mount a defense; (b) the court failed to provide written de-
cisions on key procedural issues; (c) the defendants were not informed
properly of the charges against them; (d) the conduct of defense counsel
was not conducive to a fair trial; (e) judicial turnover and the temperament
of the judges negatively impacted the trial; and (f) Trial Chamber 1 was not
independent from the judicial branch of Iraq's government. This article now
addresses each of these criticisms.1
7
A. The Defendants Lacked Adequate Time and Facilities to Mount a
Defense
1. Late or Same Day Disclosure of Evidence
HRW alleges that the prosecution did not provide the privately re-
tained defense attorneys with the incriminating documents that were to be
used at trial such that the defendants could prepare their defenses.78 This
charge is not accurate. As already detailed, privately retained defense coun-
sel were provided the entire investigative dossier and order of referral ap-
proximately two months prior to the start of trial.79 The method of disclo-
sure that the IHT utilized required the defense attorneys to visit the IHT
77 In a somewhat redundant section of the Report, HRW repeats its criticisms that the IHT
should not have permitted the Trial Chamber to read into the record complainant or witness
statements if they were untested by cross-examination. See HRW Report, supra note 8, at 49,
61-62. HRW also restates its arguments that the redaction of witness' names from the inves-
tigative dossier violated the defendants' rights to due process. See id. at 62-63. As the redac-
tion issue was addressed above, it will not be readdressed in this Section. See supra Section
II(C). The witness statement issue is address once below. See infra note 85 and accompany-
ing text.
78 See HRW Report, supra note 8, at 49.
79 See AI-Mahkama al-Jina'iya al-'Iraqiya al-'Uliya [The Iraqi High Criminal Court], al-
Dujail Opinion, available at http://www.iraq-iht.org/ar/doc/finalcour.pdf, translated in
Grotian Moment: The Saddam Hussein Trial Blog, English Translation of the Dujail Judg-
ment, Dec. 2006, pt. 1, 23, http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/dujail/opinion.asp (noting
that the file was made available to all defense attorneys on Aug. 10, 2005 and again on Aug.
15, 2005).
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courthouse so they could acquire a full set of all documents, witness state-
ments, and other evidence that would be utilized at trial. Unfortunately,
privately retained defense attorneys for multiple defendants never appeared
at the courthouse to review, examine, or obtain the file despite repeated
suggestions from the chief prosecutor and RCLO that they do so and despite
the ease of access that they had to the files.80 This lack of professionalism
on the part of these defense attorneys was endemic throughout the trial and
reflected an underlying truth that a majority of the private defense attorneys
failed to exercise the legal rights afforded to them under the IHT Statute, the
IHT Rules of Evidence and Procedure, and the Iraqi Law on Criminal Pro-
ceedings.
Relatedly, HRW charges that the prosecution engaged in "'trial by
ambush' in which incriminating documents were not disclosed to the de-
fense until the day that the document was in court by the prosecution.,
81
Putting aside the fact that defense counsel could have (and often did) chal-
lenge the authenticity, relevancy, or propriety of introducing particular
documents during the course of trial, the documents that were used at trial
(with several exceptions) were all included in the investigative dossier. It is
true that the defense counsel had no forewarning as to which of the previ-
ously disclosed documents the prosecutor would introduce on a particular
trial day. But that is not "trial by ambush." That is how all document inten-
sive complex litigations work. Had the defense attorneys wished to refer
back to the documents included in the investigative dossier that was offered
to them, they simply needed to look at the IST numbers that were included
at the bottom-right corner of each and every document introduced at trial.
As to the limited world of documents that the prosecution disclosed
during the course of trial and that was not included in the investigative dos-
sier, it is critical to understand the fundamental differences between the civil
law system as practiced in Iraq and the yardstick that HRW used to measure
against the court-the common law based adversarial system. Unlike the
common law system in which truth is derived by opposing parties delivering
partisan arguments and interpretation about evidence to a neutral fact-finder
composed of lay-people untutored in law, the civil law system is built on the
notion that expert judges resolve disputed issues of law and fact and render
determinations of guilt or innocence.82 Critical to this presumption is the
ability of civil law judges to permit the parties to introduce evidence that is
80 See id. (stating that "some defense attorneys, since they didn't live in Iraq and do not
attend but during the trial sessions, failed to receive their copies on the specified date").
81 HRW Report, supra note 8, at 49.
82 Peter J. Messitte, Common Law v. Civil Law Systems, 4 ISSUES OF DEMOCRACY 24, 27-
28 (Sept. 1999) (observing that in common law systems group of twelve ordinary citizens
called a jury decides whether an accused is innocent or guilty while in a civil law system a
judge actively investigates the case and makes findings of fact).
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probative even if it was not disclosed at an earlier stage of the trial.83 In this
case, both the prosecution and defense introduced several documents, wit-
ness statements, movies, and other material that had not been previously
disclosed. And the Tribunal granted tremendous leeway to both sides (as
permitted under Iraqi law) to present this evidence-having never excluded
anything that the prosecution or defense sought to introduce even if the evi-
dence in question had not been previously disclosed.
Accordingly, it is unfair to claim that the prosecution engaged in
"trial by ambush" 84 when all sides sought to introduce evidence not in-
cluded in the investigative dossier, the court permitted all sides the opportu-
nity to engage in this behavior, and Iraqi law (based upon civil law concepts
of adjudication and not adversarial concepts of common law litigation)
granted the judges the ability to conduct the trial in this manner.
HRW also takes issue (at least twice in the Report) with the IHT's
decision to read out the statements of twenty-three "prosecution witnesses
into the court record, without making these witnesses available for question-
ing by the defense., 8 5 This criticism too reflects a misunderstanding of the
civil law system of Iraq. First, the witnesses to which HRW refers were not
"prosecution witnesses." The court read into the record the statements of
twenty-three individuals who were levying specific complaints against the
defendants. These "complainants ' 86 were each interviewed by the investiga-
tive judge during the investigative portion of the case and/or the prosecu-
tion87 as trial moved forward. The bulk of these complainant statements
were included in the investigative dossier and were therefore part of the trial
record and evidence before the court regardless of whether the complainant
was present to testify live.
83 See James G. Apple & Robert P. Deyling, A PRIMER ON THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 27
(1995) (noting that the "absence of the ... jury also helps to explain the relative lack of
restrictions on the admissibility of evidence in the civil law system").
84 HRW Report, supra note 8, at 49.
5 Id. at 49, 61.
86 Under Iraqi law, a trial begins with testimony from a "complainant." See Law on Crimi-
nal Proceedings With Amendments, No. 23, 167 (1971), available at
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/Iraqi-Criminal-Procedure-Code.pdf. A
complainant is an individual who is directly injured by criminal conduct and is therefore
responsible for initiating criminal proceedings against the person responsible for injury. See
id. I(A). In contrast, a "witness" is an individual who did not necessarily suffer injury but
who has evidence to offer which is relevant to the criminal proceedings which the complain-
ant initiated. See id. 1 58.
87 Technically under the civil system in Iraq, the prosecutors are prosecutorial judges and
are endowed with the authority of investigative judges. See The Public Prosecution, No. 159,
arts. 3, 39 (1979) (declaring that the public prosecution shall "exercise the jurisdiction of the
examining magistrate in the locus delicti in case of his absence" and unlike the common law
system shall "work in perfect neutrality").
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Iraqi law permits trial judges to rely upon any item contained in the
investigative dossier (regardless of whether it is tested through cross-
examination at trial)88 because in the civil law system, the right of cross
examination is highly circumscribed and preserved at both the investigative
and trial stage primarily through the judges themselves and not the attor-
neys.89 Stated differently, defendants and prosecutors do not verbally spar
witnesses in the civil law system in order to find truth. 90 Instead, judges
(either at the investigative or trial stage) are the principal interrogators of all
witnesses. 9'
According to Iraqi law, neither the prosecution nor the defense has
the right to question a complainant or witness directly.92 Instead, all ques-
tions must be directed at a complainant or witness through the judges. 93 It is
entirely within the judges' discretion whether to pose a question to a par-
ticular individual.94 The civil law system presumes that the judges (who
have specialized in gathering evidence and discerning fact from untruths
immediately upon graduation from law school)95 or in limited circum-
stances, the prosecutors, will test a complainant's or witness' credibility
when initially taking an investigative statement or at the trial stage if (in the
trial chamber's discretion) they decide to call a particular witness or com-
plainant to the stand. Furthermore, because the civil system presumes that
judges (as professionally trained "truth seekers") have a better capacity than
a lay jury to discern fact from fiction, most civil codes grant judicial officers
broad discretion to permit anyone with relevant testimony to testify in court
so long as the evidence offered will aid the judges in their truth seeking
88 See Law on Criminal Proceedings With Amendments, No. 23, 172 (1971), available
at http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/Iraqi-CriminalProcedure Code.pdf
(stating that [i]f the witness does not appear... the court may decide to hear testimony pre-
viously given in the written record [and t]he testimony will be treated as though it were given
in front of the court").
89 See Apple & Deyling, supra note 83, at 28 (noting that in a civil law criminal trial
"there is no counterpart to common-law cross-examination").
90 See id. at 37.
91 See id.
92 See IHT R. EVID. & P. 57(1) ("[w]ith due consideration given to the provisions of Arti-
cle (168) of the Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedure Law, questioning and cross examination of
the witness shall be allowed for each case by the opponents to refute his statements"); see
also Law on Criminal Proceedings with Amendments, No. 23, 168 (1971), available at
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IraqiCriminal-ProcedureCodepdf
93 See IHT R. EVID. & P. 57(1).
94 See Apple & Deyling, supra note 83, at 27.
95 See id. at 38 (discussing how "[in the civil-law tradition ... a recent law graduate se-
lects the judiciary as a career and then follows a prescribed career path, first attending a
special training institute for judges, and then acting as a judge in a particular geographic
area").
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capacity--even if this testimony is untested through cross examination and
even if it was not included in the investigative dossier.
96
HRW's inability to understand the nature of civil law adjudication
is reflected in its failure to cite relevant statutory authority from the Nether-
lands (itself a civil law jurisdiction) in which courts are permitted to rely
upon a statement taken from an anonymous witness who was examined in
the presence of an examining magistrate without the accused or his counsel
being present.97 Under the Dutch system, an examining magistrate may
grant complete anonymity to a witness if there is a legitimate fear for the
witness's life, health or safety, and the witness indicates that he "does not
want to testify because of this danger." 98 When this occurs, the examining
magistrate may take the witness' statement, refuse to disclose the identity of
the witness to the defendant and counsel, and the witness does not have to
appear at trial.99
Self-evidently, a trial judge who relies upon this statement cannot
assess the reliability of the witness directly.' 00 Nevertheless, the Netherlands
still permits trial courts to rely upon such written statements so long as three
requirements are met.' 01 First, the examining magistrate must conclude that
the witness was intimidated and will not testify without a guarantee of ano-
nymity.102 Second, the case must involve a serious crime (such as murder,
hostage taking, extortion, or robbery) punishable by imprisonment for at
least four years. 10 3 Third, the judge cannot decide the defendant's guilt
"solely on the basis of the statements of the completely anonymous wit-
ness."'
104
The European Court of Human Rights examined the right of the
Netherlands to use anonymous witnesses in Kostovski v. The Netherlands.'0 5
96 See, e.g., Law on Criminal Proceedings With Amendments, No. 23, 171 (1971),
available at http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/Iraqi Criminal ProcedureCod
e.pdf (stating that "[t]he court may hear the testimony of anyone who attends it and anyone
who puts himself forward with information. It may summon any person to attend to deliver
his testimony if it is considered that this testimony will help establish the truth").
97 See Wet getuigenbescherming, (Staatsblad 1993, 603) (Feb. 1, 1994) Stb. 1993, 603
(Neth.). Under the Dutch Code, witnesses who face serious intimidation may testify anony-
mously. See A. BEIJER & A.M. VON HOORN, REPORT ON ANONYMOUS WITNESS USE IN THE
NETHERLANDS 527 (1997), available at http://www.library.uu.nl/publarchief/jb/congres/
01809180/15/b25.pdf.
98 See BELUER & VON HOORN, supra note 97, at 531.
99 See id. at 531-32.
10 See id. at 532.
101 See id. at 533.
102 See id.
103 See id.
104 Id.
'0' 166 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (1989).
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In that case, a Dutch trial court read out two statements from individuals
who had provided evidence to an examining magistrate.10 6 The defendant
was never told the identity of the witnesses at trial and did not have a
chance to cross-examine them. 0 7 In concluding that this practice violated
the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Court of Human
Rights observed that "in addition to the fact that neither the applicant nor his
counsel was present at the [investigative] interviews-the examining magis-
trates themselves were unaware of the person's identity . . ., a situation that
cannot have been without implications for testing his/her reliability."' 08 Ul-
timately, the European Court of Human Rights did not prohibit the use of
such testimony at the investigative stage of a civil law trial but did warn that
a trial court should not consider the "subsequent use of anonymous state-
ments as sufficient to found a conviction."' 1 9 Because the trial court had
convicted the applicants "to a decisive extent" on the anonymous statements
without granting the defendants the opportunity to cross examine them, the
European Court of Human Rights concluded that the defendant's right to a
fair trial had been violated.1 10
In the Ad-Dujayl trial, the IHT's introduction of twenty-three com-
plainant statements (and later an additional six witness statements) met the
standards set forth in Kostovski and permitted by civil law jurisdictions as
the Netherlands. First, the statements in question were not taken from
anonymous individuals. Each individual disclosed his or her identity to the
investigative judge or the prosecutor at the time they provided their testi-
mony. Thus, the investigative judge or prosecutor acting as investigative
judge (who are obligated under Iraqi law to protect the defendants' rights at
all phases of the investigation and trial) had full abilities to question each
individual about purported bias, hostility, or prejudice that might have im-
pacted their testimony. Of course, it would have been better if defense
counsel were present as is permitted under Iraqi law. But even if defense
counsel were present, there is no guarantee that they would have been per-
mitted to question the witnesses directly as civil law adjudication requires
the defense attorneys to pose questions to all witnesses and complainants
through the judge.
Second, the security situation in Iraq in which violence is endemic
throughout the country is of such a qualitatively different nature than that
'06 See id at 10.
107 See id. at 12.
108 Id. at 21.
109 Id.
I10 Id.
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found in the European Union and analyzed in the Kostovski case... that the
IHT had little choice but to afford testifying witnesses the privilege of with-
holding their names so that they and their family would not suffer retalia-
tion. To this end, it is important to note that Complainant Number 1 had two
cousins kidnapped, a nephew killed, and a brother shot through the legs and
permanently crippled subsequent to the complainant's proffer of public tes-
timony in the Ad-Dujayl trial." 2 The risk to these complainants and wit-
nesses was therefore not abstract. It was constant and extended to all mem-
bers of each complainant's and witness' family. Given these risks, it is re-
markable that the IHT did ensure that the full names and identities of all
witnesses and complainants were recorded in the investigative dossier so
that (at a minimum) the judges could question them about their backgrounds
and potential bias and that the only security measures taken were to redact
the witness' and complainant's names from the copies of each statement
that was provided to defense counsel.
Third, and maybe most importantly, the trial chamber did not deci-
sively rely upon these witness and/or complainant statements in crafting its
judgment. Instead the trial chamber relied primarily on the documentary
evidence adduced at trial (that independent experts examined), the live wit-
ness testimony, and the statements of the defendants themselves. Thus, the
Ad-Dujayl trial stood in marked contrast to the facts of presented in the
Kostovski case and represented a situation in which the court properly bal-
anced the critical needs of witness security against the due process rights of
the defendants. In doing so, the LHT was well within the parameters of in-
ternational human rights by reading twenty-nine witness and complainant
statements into the record when the investigative judge and trial chamber
had full knowledge of each witness' or complainant's identity and the IHT
refrained from relying decisively on these statements when drafting its opin-
ion.
111 In the Kostovski case, the court granted anonymity to the witness in question who had
information about a series of bank robberies. See id. at 11-13. The witnesses claimed (for
reasons which were never specified) that they required anonymity in order to ensure their
safety. See id. at 9-10. In comparison, the violence level in Irar (at the time of the Ad-Dujayl
trial) was extremely high as militias loyal to both Sunni insurgents and conservative Shiites
engaged in summary kidnappings, executions, car bombings, suicide attacks, and torture
against all sections of Iraq's society. The level of violence in the Dujayl region was espe-
cially bad as the multi-ethnic town (and neighboring Balad) experienced sectarian strife
between rival Sunni and Shiite groups. See Michael Luo & Qais Mizher, 26 Killed in Re-
venge Attacks Outside Baghdad, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 15, 2006, at Al 8.
112 See Brian Bennett, Saddam's Revenge, TIME, Oct. 9, 2006, at 30-31.
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2. Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence
HRW's assessment with regard to the non-disclosure of exculpatory
evidence to defense attorneys is verifiably false. 13 All such evidence was
included in the investigative dossier and to the extent that additional excul-
patory material was discovered or requested at trial, it was disclosed to the
defendants. For example, at trial, Awad al-Bandar made repeated requests to
locate the entire investigative dossier he used when trying 148 men and
boys for the failed 1982 assassination attempt in Ad-Dujayl. The IHT De-
fense Office, acting upon this request, located the file in the IHT's Secure
Evidence Unit and on June 20, 2006, provided it to Awad al-Bandar's law-
yer who signed a written document acknowledging receipt.' 1 4 Importantly,
the disclosure of this document occurred while the defense portion of the
Ad-Dujayl trial was ongoing and (despite Awad al-Bandar's protests in
open court that the document would prove that the trial he had conducted
was fair) was not utilized because of the incriminating nature of the evi-
dence therein. The Report does not explain these facts and instead states
wrongly that the IHT failed to exercise its rights to locate exculpatory evi-
dence such as this.
3. Non-Disclosure of Trial Session Notes
HRW alleges that the trial was unfair because a verbatim transcript
of the Ad-Dujayl proceedings was not made available.1 5 Although a verba-
tim transcript of each day's sessions was not made, court scribes maintained
a long hand record of the events that transpired each day. Unfortunately,
these records remained close to the judges and were not shared with the
prosecutors or the defense counsel. RCLO recognized that these long-hand
notes may not be entirely accurate and that both defense attorneys and the
prosecution may need accurate records of each trial day. The RCLO there-
fore commissioned the production of verbatim transcripts of the Ad-Dujayl
and Anfal trials. These transcripts were made by sending the videotaped
footage from the Ad-Dujayl trial to a series of stenographers who tran-
scribed each day's events and then translated the transcription from Arabic
into English." 6 Upon receipt of the transcripts, RCLO expected to redact
relevant security information and present them to defense attorneys working
on the Ad-Dujayl case. Because of the time consuming nature of this proc-
"3 See HRW Report, supra note 8, at 52-53.
114 Receipt from Defense Attorney, supra note 37.
"5 See HRW Report, supra note 8, at 53.
116 RCLO decided to translate the Arabic transcripts into English so that RCLO staff mem-
bers, international advisers to the Trial Chamber and Defense Office, and English speaking
privately retained defense attorneys could access the full trial record.
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ess, the transcripts were not complete in time to be provided to defense
counsel in the Ad-Dujayl trial.
The transcripts were, however, provided to Trial Chamber 1 so that
it could rely upon them (in addition to the scribes' long handed notes) in
drafting its opinion. It is expected that the IHT will redact these transcripts
in due course so that the names of witnesses and defense attorneys will not
get released. Once this process is completed, it is hoped that the IHT will
post these transcripts on its website so that the international community can
understand better what actually happened during the course of the Ad-
Dujayl trial. It is also expected that the IHT will obtain relevant transcripts
for the Anfal trial and redact relevant security information so that they can
be presented to defense counsel in time to prepare for the defense portion of
the Anfal case. If this occurs, the ability of the defense to better prepare for
the allegations levied against their clients in the Anfal trial will be improved
and the flaw identified in HRW's Report with regard to accurate court re-
porting will be corrected.
4. Chain of Custody Documentation and Handwriting Experts
HRW criticizes that the Ad-Dujayl trial as unfair because the de-
fense attorneys were precluded from introducing international experts to
analyze the signatures on various documents." 17 This argument confuses the
role of experts in a civil law trial. In the civil law system, the court itself
hires experts to assist it in ascertaining truth"' 8 Indeed, as officers of the
court, the experts are responsive only to the judges-as opposed to the
prosecution or defense." 9 The experts are tasked with remaining neutral and
to provide an unbiased opinion as to the issues before them. 20 As Iraq is a
civil law country, its criminal procedure code follows these dictates, and
expert testimony is only permitted if the court so requests.' 21 The defense's
117 See HRW Report, supra note 8, at 57-58 (stating that "by denying the defendants the
opportunity to call their own expert to offer an opinion, the court does not appear to have
considered the requirement of equality at arms").
"'8 See Sir David Edward, Evidence, Proof, Fact-Finding, and the Expert Witness 7 (Apr.
29, 2004), available at http://www.law.du.edu/david edward/publications/pdf/CD/'Proof,%
20Fact-findingo20and%2Othe%2OExpert%20Witness'%20(7th%2OSir/o2OMichae.pdf (stat-
ing that in the civil law system it is the judge, as opposed to the advocates, who "may decide
that it would be a good to idea to have a report from an expert").
119 See id. at 8 (stating that in the civil law context, expert witnesses are "are simply one
tool in the judge's armoury of decision making. They are one way in which a judge may go
about deciding on an element in the case that needs to be established one way or another.").
120 See id.
121 Law on Criminal Proceedings With Amendments, No. 23, 69 (1971), available at
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/Iraqi Criminal ProcedureCode.pdf (stat-
ing that the "magistrate or investigator may ... appoint one or more experts to offer opinions
on matters connected to the offence being investigated").
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and HRW's contention that international partisan experts (retained by the
defense) were required to protect their rights therefore has no merit when
viewed in light of these civil law traditions-that are widely different than
the traditions of partisan expert witnesses utilized in adversarial courts.
To understand better the situation in the Ad-Dujayl Trial with re-
gard to handwriting experts, one must also be aware that Trial Chamber 1
retained an initial panel of handwriting experts who reviewed the original
signatures on each contested document and compared these signatures
against handwriting exemplars that only certain defendants provided. The
panel then submitted its conclusions as to the validity of each signature (in
writing) to the trial chamber. For those defendants who refused to provide
handwriting exemplars, the IHT warned them that their refusal would be
construed against them. Once Trial Chamber 1 received the initial handwrit-
ing reports from the first panel of experts, it immediately retained another
expert panel to review again each challenged document. This second panel
was retained in order to ensure that the rights of the defendants were better
protected.
Trial Chamber 1 then considered the factual findings of both panels
of experts when drafting its verdict and deciding whether to afford a par-
ticular document any weight. HRW's contention that the defense should
have been provided with the identities of these experts' 22 does not address
the security concerns of the handwriting experts. Every handwriting expert
participating in the Ad-Dujayl trial (in view of the security situation and in
view of the privately retained defense bar's consistent pattern of releasing
the names and identities of people participating in the IHT process on the
Internet) demanded that their identities remain concealed from the private
defense bar and the public.
HRW further alleges that the Ad-Dujayl trial was unfair because the
court did not require chain of custody evidence to be introduced at trial. 23
HRW properly alleges that "[i]nformation concerning the source and chain
of custody of a document is essential to assess how much weight should be
placed on the document. 124
Although such evidence was not introduced at trial, it is maintained
with the SEU, which documents the manner of receipt of every document in
its possession. In fact, each document in the SEU's possession is catalogued
with a description of the date of seizure, person responsible for seizure, and
transfer of custody of such documents from the point of collection to the
SEU. Once a documents arrives at the SEU, the chain of custody informa-
tion is recorded, each document is meticulously analyzed by IHT investiga-
122 See HRW Report, supra note 8, at 58.
123 See id. at 56.
124 See id
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tors for relevancy to a particular case, the document is labeled with a unique
identifying number, summarized, translated, and scanned into the IHT's
computerized document management system so that judges and prosecutors
are able to access the collection via the Internet and are able to have the
document's full history before them. Privately retained defense attorneys
are not provided full access to the IHT's document management system for
security reasons, 25 but they are able to conduct searches by submitting que-
ries to the IHT Defense Office for relevant documents. This protocol was
used, for example, to locate Awad al-Bandar's missing Revolutionary
Command Council Court file.
126
Given the SEU's history of meticulous record keeping, it was short-
sighted of Trial Chamber 1 not to inquire with the SEU about the chain of
custody of specific documents when presented with challenges regarding
their veracity. Trial Chamber l's decision to refrain from presenting this
evidence in court is even more puzzling considering that the SEU itself had
identified a representative during the Ad-Dujayl trial to testify about the
protocol for seizing, cataloguing, and maintaining documents in the SEU.
Additionally, the persons responsible for seizing the bulk of the documents
entered into evidence at the Ad-Dujayl trial were also prepared to testify as
to the location, method, and manner of seizure of a vast majority of the
challenged documents.
For reasons not entirely clear to the author, Trial Chamber 1 de-
cided that evidence of this type was not relevant despite numerous discus-
sions on this point with international advisers. The trial chamber instead
limited itself to analyzing the signatures on any document in question
through handwriting experts. Upon reflection, Trial Chamber 1 would have
injected more transparency into the process had it introduced chain of cus-
125 The documents contained in the IHT's electronic archives contain the names, addresses,
and other identifying information of thousands of witnesses, complainants, and other indi-
viduals relevant to the IHT process. Because the IT has concerns that members of the pri-
vately retained defense bar may threaten, intimidate, or distribute information about these
individuals to the public, it has refrained from giving the privately retained defense bar full
access to the [HT document management system. Although the IHT initially considered
providing such access to the private defense bar, the conduct of the privately retained defense
attorneys during the course of the Ad-Dujayl trial, which included allegations of witness
intimidation, the subornation of perjury, and releasing the names of individuals associated
with the lHT on an insurgent website, www.albasrah.net, caused the IHT to reconsider this
idea and to limit itself to the conduct of queries and release of documents from the IHT
document management system through the IHT Defense Office.
126 To locate this document, the defense attorney for Awad al-Bandar consulted with repre-
sentatives of the IHT Defense Office who then submitted relevant document queries to the
director of the SEU. The director of the SEU produced all documents associated with the
queries to the Defense Law Adviser who then reviewed the documents until the missing file
was located. The file was then provided to Awad al-Bandar's defense attorney. See Receipt
from Defense Attorney, supra note 37.
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tody evidence into the record-particularly since the IHT had nothing to
hide. Hopefully, the Anfal trial chamber will learn lessons from the Ad-
Dujayl trial and inquire more diligently about the chain of custody of docu-
ments should this issue arise in that case.
5. Scheduling of Trial Sessions and Closing of the Defense Case
HRW asserts that Trial Chamber 1 should have conducted a pre-
trial conference and set the court schedule with the participation of defense
counsel. 127 Because civil law adjudication is non-partisan, there is no re-
quirement for the IHT to set its schedule with the participation of defense
counsel. That said, each trial chamber conducts its business according to the
rules that it sets to conduct trial. Thus, Trial Chamber 1 did not conduct a
pre-trial hearing to set court scheduling matters, but Trial Chamber 2 (which
is adjudicating the Anfal trial) learned from the lessons of Ad-Dujayl and
conducted a pre-trial hearing with all participants to set the court's schedule.
HRW also alleges that the Ad-Dujayl trial was unfair because the
court perfunctorily closed the defendant's cases without consultation or
reason. 128 This charge is false. The court permitted fifty-six witnesses to
testify on behalf of the defendants (in comparison the court heard inculpa-
tory live testimony from twenty-eight complainants/witnesses and heard
inculpatory written testimony from thirty-two others) and devoted approxi-
mately half of the trial to the conduct of the defense case. The court ended
the defense case (in accordance with civil law traditions) after engaging in
multiple discussions (both in open court and in chambers) with the defense
counsel about their specific needs and requirements with regard to their
cases.
For those who witnessed the defense portion of the Ad-Dujayl trial,
the dance in which the privately retained defense bar was engaged would
have seemed comical had it not consumed so much of the tribunal's time.
Day after day, privately retained defense counsel entered the court with a
particular witness list and made requests to transport the identified individu-
als to the IHT. The very next day, these same attorneys would substitute the
previously issued list with a new list and then repeat the process multiple
times over the course of weeks.
29
127 See HRW Report, supra note 8, at 58-59.
128 See id. at 59.
129 For example, on May 24, 2006, Judge Ra'ouf grew exasperated with this practice and
chastised defense counsel by stating, "You have submitted ten lists and not just one, ten lists.
You are not allowed to submit a list every day, it is not allowed at all." The defense attorney
replied that "we have submitted one list and not ten like you are claiming .... If you have
proof that we have submitted ten lists, then show it to us and present it to this court." Judge
Ra'ouf responded by waiving multiple witness lists at the defense attorney (including the one
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They did this even though the IHT Rules of Evidence and Proce-
dure require that they submit their witness lists fifteen days prior to the start
of trial.13° Notwithstanding this rule and the private defense attorneys' re-
peated practice of last-minute witness list alteration and substitution, the
IHT continuously accepted the new witness lists and the introduction of any
and all witnesses whom the defense presented in court. The IHT's patience
with the defense counsel's behavior was only cut short after several weeks
of witness shuffling and after the IHT concluded that the defense attorneys
were not capable of introducing further evidence that was either probative
or relevant to the issues before it. Even more critical, is that the court made
this ruling after four of the witnesses whom the defense attorneys for Sad-
dam Hussein introduced admitted to the commission of perjury.'31 There is
therefore no merit to HRW's contention that Trial Chamber 1 engaged in
unfair trial practices when it cut short the defendant's case on June 13,
2006. By that date, the court had extended every courtesy required to ensure
that the defense counsel were able to present their arguments to the IHT,
and the defense counsel had simply abused the IHT's trust.
HRW's statement that the trial chamber should have provided a
written explanation as to why it cut short the defense counsel case on June
13, 2006132 also lacks merit as Iraqi law does not contain any requirement
for the issuance of interlocutory written decisions. Instead, Iraqi law permits
the court to issue rulings from the bench and to reserve the actual reasoning
for its decisions in the final written judgment. And the Ad-Dujayl written
judgment did provide a fully detailed explanation as to why the court ended
the defense counsel presentation. In the trial chamber's view, the evidence
that the defense continued to present was irrelevant, cumulative, and fo-
cused primarily on the defendants' character as opposed to the specific ele-
ments in the case. 133 Deciding to end the defense portion of the case for
he had submitted that day) and stated, "Today you submitted a list, and everyday you do so,
and then you add another."
130 See IHT R. EvID. & P. 41(1)(D).
131 See Al-Mahkama al-Jina'iya al-'Iraqiya al-'Uliya [The Iraqi High Criminal Court], al-
Dujail Opinion, available at http://www.iraq-iht.org/ar/doc/finalcour.pdf, translated in
Grotian Moment: The Saddam Hussein Trial Blog, English Translation of the Dujail Judg-
ment, Dec. 2006, pt. 1, 12, http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/dujail/opinion.asp; see also
infra, note 156 and accompanying text.
132 HRW Report, supra note 8, at 59-60.
133 See, e.g., AI-Mahkama al-Jina'iya al-'Iraqiya al-'Uliya [The Iraqi High Criminal Court],
al-Dujail Opinion, available at http://www.iraq-iht.org/ar/doc/finalcour.pdf, translated in
Grotian Moment: The Saddam Hussein Trial Blog, English Translation of the Dujail Judg-
ment, Dec. 2006, pt. 2, 52, http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/dujail/opinion.asp (stating
that "[miost of [Hussein's witnesses'] statements were either general or irrelevant ... or
based upon what they hard others say (hearsay) or focused on proving that there was an
attempt to assassinate the former president").
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these reasons was principled and legally correct (as opposed to "indifferent
to or ignorant of the relevant procedural principles") 34 in view of how the
defense counsel conducted their portion of their case and in view of the lack
of probative evidence that the defense witnesses had offered.
B. The Court Failed to Provide Written Decisions on Key Procedural
Issues
HRW argues that "[t]he transparency of the [Ad-Dujayl] trial was
greatly diminished by the consistent failure of the court to publicly issue
written decisions [and address] ... at least six written motions-[on] issues
such as the time needed for the defense to prepare, security for defense
counsel, recall of witnesses, scheduling of trial sessions, and the legality of
the court."'' 35 This statement is (like many in the Report) correct as an abso-
lute matter but incorrect in terms of the specifics of what occurred at trial
and incorrect in light of Iraqi law.
First, there are no provisions in Iraqi law that required Trial Cham-
ber 1 to issue written decisions on procedural issues until such time as the
final judgment was released. Instead, Iraqi law required the trial chamber to
issue oral bench decisions on various defense submissions either immedi-
ately after receipt or shortly thereafter. The IHT reserved its right to provide
written justifications for these decisions in the final judgment, which was
released on November 22, 2006. And that judgment effectively disposed of
at least eight legal issues that defense counsel raised in writing during the
course of trial including: (1) the defense counsel's use of the lex mitior
principle to challenge to the IHT's power to impose the death penalty; (2)
the IHT's legitimacy; (3) the defense claim that it did not receive the inves-
tigative dossier in a timely fashion; (4) defense claims that security condi-
tions in Iraq (and the killing of three defense attorneys) rendered the trial
unfair; (5) the defense request that Judge Ra'ouf recuse himself for bias; (6)
defense claims that Saddam Hussein was entitled to head of state immunity;
(7) arguments with regard to the ex-post facto application of laws (including
crimes against humanity) against the defendants; and (8) defense counsel
contentions that the IHT summarily cut off the defense counsel case in an
ad-hoc and arbitrary manner.
With regard to these motions, HRW also fails to note that each and
every one of these issues was rejected in open court at various stages of the
Ad-Dujayl trial by either Judge Rizgar or Judge Ra'ouf. Thus, HRW's
statement that Trial Chamber 1 ignored procedural motions136 is not correct.Rather, the IHT considered these procedural requests, rejected them orally
134 HRW Report, supra note 8, at 60.
131 Id. at 63--64.
136 See id at 63-64.
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to defense counsel, and placed its reasoning for these rejections in the final
judgment. Such practice comports with controlling Iraqi law and interna-
tional law. 137 To the extent that the trial chamber's final judgment did not
address other key procedural issues (such as why it read twenty-nine com-
plainant and/or witness statements into the record or redacted the referral
file) in writing, it is only because the defense attorneys did not present such
arguments to the court in writing. If these arguments were not presented to
the IHT in writing, the IHT did not respond in writing.
C. The Defendants were Not Informed of the Charges
HRW's primary criticism with regard to notice of the charges to the
defendants rests upon the assertion that the relevant documents that were
disclosed failed to identify the "theory of liability" that the IHT would apply
at trial. 3 ' Stated differently, HRW declares that the defendants were not
provided with proper evidence of the specific facts that might demonstrate
whether they were being tried under a theory of command responsibility,
joint criminal enterprise, conspiracy, or some other theory of liability set
forth under Article 15 of the IiHT Statute.139 With regard to this specific
point, it is important to note that each defendant was provided with a sum-
mary order of referral on August 10, 2005 in conjunction with the entire
dossier of evidence that would be used to try the defendants. HRW states
that this disclosure was insufficient to meet international standards because
it "contained no information whatsoever about each defendant's alleged role
in the crime, or what theory of liability was to be used against each defen-
dant. '' 140 This statement is correct and the IHT should ensure that future
orders of referral do not suffer this shortfall.
At the same time, this statement again fails to acknowledge how the
civil law system of Iraq differs from the adversarial system used in other
courts-such as the United States. In the civil law system utilized in Iraq,
the Order of Referral indicates that an investigative judge has determined
that there is enough evidence to warrant a trial on specified charges. 14' The
Ad-Duj ayl Order of Referral specified that each defendant was charged with
the crimes against humanity of premeditated murder, forcible transfer, im-
137 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2003-07/08/09-PT, Decision on the
Application for a Stay of Proceedings and Denial of Right to Appeal, 1 31 (Nov. 4, 2003)
(holding that the Special Court for Sierra Leone need not stay all proceedings until the Trial
Chamber could rule on the lawfulness of certain procedures).
138 See HRW Report, supra note 8, at 45.
139 See id. at 46-48.
140 See id. at 46.
141 See Law on Criminal Proceedings With Amendments, No. 23, 130(B) (1971), avail-
able at http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IraqiCriminalProcedureCode.
pdf.
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prisonment, and torture. The specific facts relevant to these charges were
not set forth in the Order of Referral as Iraqi law does not require this speci-
ficity. Rather, the facts underlying these charges were set forth in the ap-
proximately nine hundred pages of evidence disclosed in conjunction with
the dossier. Accordingly, the judges, defense counsel, and prosecutors were
obligated to review the investigative dossier to discern the facts that were
relevant to each charge and to each defendant. Admittedly, this procedure
compels the defense attorneys to actually come to the IHT and pick up the
dossier so they can review it and understand the facts relevant to the charges
set forth in the Order of Referral, but the judges themselves bear the same
burden.
It is important to note, however, that, even if the Ad-Dujayl Order
of Referral was deficient and that even if the defense counsel had to under-
take significant independent analysis to understand how the evidence in the
case file was relevant to the charges, the Order of Referral was supple-
mented during the course of the Ad-Dujayl trial by a more detailed charging
instrument. 142 In accordance with Iraqi law, Trial Chamber 1 reviewed the
sufficiency of the evidence in the case file by hearing complainants, wit-
nesses, reviewing documents, and calling experts to testify. And on May 15,
2006, the trial chamber decided that the evidence presented in the investiga-
tive dossier and reviewed in court was sufficient to warrant the issuance of
an additional notice instrument to the defendants-the formal charging
document. 143 The formal charging document for each defendant contained
detailed substantive charges and (unlike the order of referral) specified
modes of liability for these charges that were tailored to each defendant.
HRW is correct in pointing out that, subsequent to the issuance of these
detailed charging documents, the defendants were immediately forced to
begin presenting their defenses and that this "effectively den[ied the defen-
dants] any opportunity to revise or amend their defense in accordance with
the more detailed notice [of the formal charging document]."' 44 But the Re-
port nowhere acknowledges that the defendants had approximately five
months thereafter to synthesize their defenses on the basis of this revised
notice. This is so because the court permitted the defendants until October 1
to submit closing briefs to the IHT.
142 Interestingly, the defendants themselves never complained to the IHT for more detailed
charging instruments which contained the specificity demanded in HRW's report.
143 John F. Bums, Hussein Ruling Seems to Raise Execution Odds, N.Y. TIMES, May 16,
2006, at Al (describing Trial Chamber l's decision to issue the formal charging document to
the defendants on May 15, 2006); See Law on Criminal Proceedings With Amendments, No.
23, 187 (1971), available at http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IraqiCrim
inalProcedureCode.pdf
144 HRW Report, supra note 8, at 47.
2006-2007]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
The above facts demonstrate that, although there were problems in
notice to the defendants, each and every defendant was aware of the specific
charges to be presented against them in court and of the evidence relevant to
those charges as early as August 10, 2005. And the defendants had ap-
proximately five months after the issuance of formal charges (which did
meet international standards) to mount any defenses to the court based upon
either the charges or the modes of liability relevant to each defendant.
D. Conduct of Defense Counsel
HRW's statement that the "performance of Iraqi defense counsel-
whether privately retained or appointed by the Defense Office-was gener-
ally poor" is correct with a few caveats. 45 The privately retained defense
bar and the IHT Defense Office (although generally lacking training or in-
struction in international criminal law) were each capably assisted with in-
ternational legal assistance. For example, Saddam Hussein was assisted
throughout his trial by several lawyers with international legal expertise
including Dr. Najeeb al-Nuaimi (a former Minister of Justice of Qatar who
has litigated cases before the International Court of Justice), Ramsey Clark
(a former Attorney General of the United States), Issam Ghazzawi (a Jorda-
nian lawyer with significant international criminal law expertise), and oth-
ers. 146 Similarly, the Defense Law Adviser advised the IHT Defense Office
and (when requested) privately retained defense attorneys for all defendants
about matters of international criminal law.
147
HRW states wrongly in the Report that "[t]he absence of any train-
ing or instruction in international criminal law was evident in the failure of
defense counsel to raise or discuss any relevant international criminal law
principles during the course of the trial.' 48 To the contrary, defense counsel
raised multiple public international law or international criminal law issues
to the IHT during the Ad-Dujayl trial. These issues included, but were not
limited to, the IHT's legitimacy, ex-post facto application of law, lex mitior,
and other complex issues of law in written submissions that were presented
at various points during the course of the Ad-Dujayl. 149 Likewise, Judge
145 See id. at 69.
146 See John Simpson, Anger and Exits at Saddam Trial, BBC NEwS, Dec. 5, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/4498960.stm (describing how the defense team for
Saddam Hussein, including three foreign lawyers-the former U.S. Attorney General Ram-
sey Clark, the former justice minister of Qatar, Najeeb al-Nuaimi, and a Jordanian, Issam al-
Ghazzaw-walked out of court).
147 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
148 HRW Report, supra note 8, at 69.
149 See A1-Mahkama al-Jina'iya al-'iraqiya al-'Uliya [The Iraqi High Criminal Court], al-
Dujail Opinion, available at http://www.iraq-iht.org/ar/doc/finalcour.pdf, translated in
Grotian Moment: The Saddam Hussein Trial Blog, English Translation of the Dujail Judg-
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Rizgar Amin conducted a half day of oral argument on issues such as the
IHT's legitimacy early on in the Ad-Dujayl trial. And (as already noted) the
IHT Defense Office attorneys presented substantive closing statements that
raised a host of international criminal law arguments.
This is not to say that privately retained defense counsel worked to
preserve the integrity of the IHT process. Lawyers for Saddam Hussein con-
sistently engaged in outrageous political speeches and outright contempt of
the IHT. For example, a Lebanese lawyer working for Saddam Hussein,
Bushra al-Khalil, repeatedly insulted Judge Ra'ouf and, at one court session,
displayed pictures of prison abuses in Abu Ghraib. 150 At another court ses-
sion she even went so far as to remove her defense counsel robes and hurl
them at the bench."5' Notably, Judge Ra'ouf never instituted criminal sanc-
tions against her (or any defense attorneys) for this behavior although the
IHT Statute and Iraqi law would have permitted him to detain and fine her
for this misbehavior.1
52
Private defense attorneys for Saddam Hussein, along with others,
also engaged in repeated boycotts-thereby abandoning their clients in a
capital case-and refrained from ever advancing a coherent theory on the
evidence, which might have benefited their clients.153 Instead, they stood by
as defendants such as Saddam Hussein and Barzan al-Tikriti confessed to
ordering various levels of atrocities committed against the citizens of Ad-
Dujayl and otherwise limited their legal arguments to repeated and cursory
rants against the "occupiers." HRW's statement that "[t]he repeated threat
and use of the [boycott] tactic created the strong impression that some coun-
sel deliberately sought to delay or obstruct the course of the trial" is entirely
correct. 154 Most importantly, HRW is accurate in observing that the pri-
ment, Dec. 2006, pt. 1, 26-44, pt. 2, 1-6, http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/dujailU
opinion.asp.
150 See Edward Wong, Saddam Admits he Swiftly Doomed 148 Villagers, INT'L HERALD
TRIBUNE, Apr. 6, 2006, at 5 (stating that "[i]n the midaftemoon, one of Saddam's lawyers, a
Lebanese woman named Bushra Khalil, stood up with posters of naked men in Abu Ghraib
who had been abused by the Americans in the infamous scandal, prompting bailiffs to escort
her out as she yelled at the judge").
151 See Hassan M. Fattah, For a Shiite, Defending Hussein is a Labor of Love, N.Y. TIMES,
June 24, 2006, at A4 (describing how in May 2006, when Judge Ra'ouf cited Bushra al-
Khalil "for speaking out of turn, ordering guards to forcibly eject her from court[, she] pulled
off her judicial robe and threw it on the floor, pushing guards who were grabbing at her
hands").
152 See Law on Criminal Proceedings With Amendments, No. 23, 153 (1971), available
at http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/raqiCriminalProcedure Code.pdf
(providing that if an individual violates the administrative procedures of the court, the judge
"may rule immediately for detention for 24 hours or a fine not exceeding 3 dinars").
153 See HRW Report, supra note 8, at 70.
154 See id.
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vately retained defense bar's threat and use of boycott "greatly diminished
the ability of privately retained counsel to raise legitimate and serious pro-
cedural concerns that did persist in relation to the trial.""'
Even more disturbing was a series of events that transpired on May
30-31, 2006. On those days, four witnesses for Saddam Hussein testified
that they had met Chief Prosecutor Jaa'far Al Mousawi at a July 2004 me-
morial service for the victims of Ad-Dujayl. 156 The witnesses testified fur-
ther that Prosecutor Jaa'far had offered them money to testify against Sad-
dam Hussein.157 Defense attorneys for Saddam Hussein purported to prove
this allegation by playing a video of the memorial service in question.'58 On
the video was a man who the defense claimed was Prosecutor Jaa'far Al-
Mousawi. 159 In response to the video display, the prosecutor denied that he
was present during the memorial service and stated that he had never visited
Ad-Dujayl 60 Prosecutor Jaa'far then called a man who looked somewhat
similar to him into the room (Abd al-Aziz Muhammad Bandr) and asked
whether he was the man on the video. 161 Abd al-Aziz Muhammad Bandr
stated that he was the man on the video and that he had organized the me-
morial service. 162 The full Trial Chamber, prosecutors, and entire defense
team acknowledged without doubt that the man on the tape was Abd al-Aziz
Muhammad Bandr and not Prosecutor Jaa'far Al-Mousawi. 16
3
Notwithstanding, at least one more witness for Saddam Hussein
was called to testify. This witness claimed again that he had seen Prosecutor
Jaa'far Al-Mousawi at the 2004 Ad Dujayl memorial service and that
Prosecutor Jaa'far was videotaped there. 64 Prosecutor Jaa'far then walked
155 Id.
156 See A1-Mahkama al-Jina'iya al-'Iraqiya al-'Uliya [The Iraqi High Criminal Court], al-
Dujail Opinion, available at http://www.iraq-iht.org/ar/doc/finalcour.pdf, translated in
Grotian Moment: The Saddam Hussein Trial Blog, English Translation of the Dujail Judg-
ment, Dec. 2006, pt. 1, 12, http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/dujail/opinion.asp.
157 See id.
158 See id.
159 See id.
160 See id.
161 See id.
162 See id.
163 On June 12, 2006, for example, Defense Attorney Najib Al-Nuami testified, "When the
CD was shown, I personally said this is not the general prosecutor in the CD." See Transcript
of Record at 32, al-Dujail Trial, (June 12, 2006) (No. 2) (on file with author).
164 For example, the witness explained that he was at a party commemorating the failed
assassination attempt against Saddam Hussein and that the participants kept talking
about was how proud they were, and they were showing off about the assassination
attempt in 1982. Sir, before the party ended they shared pictures of all the victims
of this treacherous incident. While I was among them, I saw a man, and I asked
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around to the witness box, and asked the witness to take a close look at his
face.165 The witness examined Prosecutor Jaa'far and swore that he had seen
Prosecutor Jaa'far at the memorial service and that Prosecutor Jaa'far was
the man on the video.166 The witness testified further that he had dined with
several people who defendant Awad al-Bandar allegedly ordered executed
in 1983.167 The witness then claimed that twenty-three people whom Awad
Al-Bandar allegedly executed were alive.1
68
When the witness was asked to identify victims who were allegedly
alive, he began to read names off of a handwritten paper. 169 The court asked
whether the witness could name people who were allegedly alive without
the aid of the paper. 70 The witness was unable to do so and provided the
paper to the court.' 7' The court then asked the witness to write the names of
people who were allegedly alive on a separate sheet of paper.172 The witness
was able to provide only a few names, and the names provided did not
match the names on the list that the court previously confiscated. 73 Even
worse, the witness's handwriting was completely different than the hand-
writing on the confiscated list.' 74 When the court asked the witness whether
he had written the original list of allegedly surviving victims from Ad Du-
jayl, the witness stated that the names were provided to him by an unknown
source. 175 In view of this admission, the court ordered each witness (four in
total) who had testified about Prosecutor Jaa'far's alleged appearance at the
who he was. They told me that he was a lawyer. It turns out, Your Honor, that he
was the Chief Prosecutor.
See Transcript of Record at 13, al-Dujail Trial, (May 31, 2006) (No. 3) (on file with author).
165 The witness declared several times that he could confirm Prosecutor Jaa'far's atten-
dance at the service, declaring, "[b]y Allah's will, I saw you, but not that time." See id. at 30.
166 See id.
167 Al-Mahkama al-Jina'iya al-'Iraqiya al-'Uliya [The Iraqi High Criminal Court], al-Dujail
Opinion, available at http://www.iraq-iht.org/ar/doc/finalcour.pdf, translated in Grotian
Moment: The Saddam Hussein Trial Blog, English Translation of the Dujail Judgment, Dec.
2006, pt. 1, 13, http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/dujail/opinion.asp.
168 See id
169 See Transcript of Record at 13, al-Dujail Trial, (May 31, 2006) (No. 3) (on file with
author).
170 See id.
171 See id. at 14.
172 See id. at 15.
173 See id
174 Upon receipt of the list of names, Judge Ra'ouf stated, "[n]o, this pen is black, and the
other pen is-this is not even your handwriting." See id
... See id. at 18-20 (stating that the witness had intermittently received the names from the
newspapers, from attorneys, and from various unknown sources).
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2004 memorial service bound over for investigation into alleged perjury in
violation of paragraphs 251 and 252 of Iraq's 1969 Penal Code.
176
On Friday, June 2, 2006, the IHT conducted an investigative session
with each of the witnesses.177 The witnesses were represented by an IHT
appointed defense attorney from the IHT Defense Office as well as the De-
fense Law Adviser.178 The witnesses were questioned individually and to-
gether by a representative from Trial Chamber 1 and a representative (not
Prosecutor Jaa'far) from the IHT Prosecutor's Office about whether they
had seen Prosecutor Jaa'far A1-Mousawi at the 2004 Ad-Dujayl memorial
service. The witnesses were also asked whether Prosecutor Jaa'far had of-
fered them money to testify against Saddam Hussein.
In response to these questions, two witnesses stated that they were
not from Ad-Dujayl and that they had never visited Ad-Dujayl even though
they had testified that they were born and raised in Ad-Dujayl. 79 One wit-
ness was born and raised in Baghdad while another was from Taji. 180 The
witnesses stated that defense attorneys for Saddam Hussein had ordered
them to claim that they were from Ad-Dujayl. 181 The witness also admitted
that defense attorneys for Saddam Hussein told them to claim that Prosecu-
tor Jaa'far had attempted to bribe them. 82 All the witnesses stated that they
were not at the 2004 Ad-Dujayl memorial service. 183 The witnesses also
stated that defense counsel for Saddam Hussein offered them housing in
Damascus, Syria and jobs in the event that they testified as instructed on
behalf of Saddam Hussein. 184 One witness stated that he worked for an
American contractor in Tikrit and that defense counsel had kidnapped his
176 Al-Mahkama al-Jina'iya al-'Iraqiya al-'Uliya [The Iraqi High Criminal Court], al-Dujail
Opinion, available at http://www.iraq-iht.org/ar/doc/finalcour.pdf, translated in Grotian
Moment: The Saddam Hussein Trial Blog, English Translation of the Dujail Judgment, Dec.
2006, pt. 1, 12-13, http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/dujail/opinion.asp.
177 See id.
178 See Transcript of Record at 28, al-Dujail Trial, (June 12, 2006) (No. 2) (on file with
author) (declaring "[a]ll these testimonies are video taped with video and audio, and in the
presence of the general prosecutor and an attorney representing these witnesses who later on
became defendants").
179 See A1-Mahkama al-Jina'iya al-'Iraqiya al-'Uliya [The Iraqi High Criminal Court], al-
Dujail Opinion, available at http://www.iraq-iht.org/ar/doc/fmalcour.pdf, translated in
Grotian Moment: The Saddam Hussein Trial Blog, English Translation of the Dujail Judg-
ment, Dec. 2006, pt. 1, 13, http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/dujail/opinion.asp.
180 See id.
181 See id.
182 See id.
183 See id.
1'4 See id.
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son and told him that, if he did not testify on behalf of Saddam Hussein, his
son would be killed.
185
Each witness stated that they were transported to Syria where they
met with a former bodyguard of Saddam Hussein name named Abu Omar
and defense attorney Khaleel Al-Dolami.186 The witnesses stated that
Khaleel al-Dolami and Abu Omar coached them on what to say when testi-
fying on behalf of defendant Saddam Hussein. 87 The fourth witness stated
that Abu Omar provided him a list of twenty-three names.1 88 According to
the witness, Abu Omar ordered him to claim to the IHT that the twenty-
three people were still alive even though defendant Awad al-Bandar had
ordered them executed.1 89 The witness stated that he brought this list with
him to the IHT and used it when testifying until such time as the Presiding
Judge confiscated it and asked him whether the handwriting therein was his
own. 
190
After the investigation session concluded, each witness was pro-
vided with a statement that they reviewed, modified, and signed with the
assistance of their attorney.1 91 The matter was then referred to the Al-Karkh
criminal court for further investigation and prosecution.' 92 Each witness was
photographed and examined for signs of mistreatment and released on bail.
The defense attorneys' response to the exposure of this potentially
criminal conduct was to claim that the witnesses had been assaulted and
detained incommunicado. This claim (like so many other unfounded claims
of torture and abuse levied against the IHT throughout trial) was utterly
false as the witnesses were detained in a location that permitted independent
185 See id.; see also Transcript of Record at 22, al-Dujail Trial, (June 12, 2006) (No. 2) (on
file with author) (declaring that the witness worked "with the Rafidain Security Contingent
for six months from March till September").
186 See AI-Mahkama al-Jina'iya al-'Iraqiya al-'Uliya [The Iraqi High Criminal Court], al-
Dujail Opinion, available at http://www.iraq-iht.org/ar/doc/finalcour.pdf, translated in
Grotian Moment: The Saddam Hussein Trial Blog, English Translation of the Dujail Judg-
ment, Dec. 2006, pt. 1, 13, http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/dujail/opinion.asp.
187 See id.
188 Transcript of Record at 27-28, al-Dujail Trial, (June 12, 2006) (No. 2) (explaining that
the witness stated that Ahmad Addoushi (a.k.a Abu Omar) had provided him the names and
that "against every name there was a remark that this man is alive and well, and the other
was executed after the Dujayl incident, or is that, he resides in Iran and the other died a natu-
ral death before the events").
189 See id.
190 See id.
'9' See id. at 28.
192 Al-Mahkama al-Jina'iya al-'Iraqiya al-'Uliya [The Iraqi High Criminal Court], al-Dujail
Opinion, available at http://www.iraq-iht.org/ar/doc/finalcour.pdf, translated in Grotian
Moment: The Saddam Hussein Trial Blog, English Translation of the Dujail Judgment, Dec.
2006, pt. 1, 13, http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/dujail/opinion.asp.
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monitoring and videotape of the entirety of their incarceration. More impor-
tantly, the investigative session against the four witnesses commenced only
when (at the commencement of a perfunctory bail hearing that was sup-
posed to take only minutes) one witness stated to IHT representatives that
other witnesses were complicit in perjury and had threatened him harm
upon release. Instead of torture, the chief prosecutor ordered a spaghetti
dinner for the witnesses (since it quickly became apparent that the short bail
hearing was transforming into a more lengthy affair) and simply told all
present to treat each witness with respect. Upon release, each witness was
again videotaped and asked whether they were mistreated. They all stated
that they were treated fairly, transported back to the secure witness camp
inside the International Zone whereupon they left Iraq.
In a testament to the IHT's professionalism, Judge Ra'ouf read each
investigative statement in open court on June 12, 2006 to the defendants
who had retained the implicated defense attorneys-thereby alerting the
defendants about the conduct of their attorneys.1 93 In spite of this, each de-
fendant remained confident in their attorney's abilities, never requesting to
change defense counsel or for a mistrial in view of their counsel's conduct.
As HRW acknowledges, the witness' confessions and events that
led to these confessions "rais[ed] grave concerns about serious professional
misconduct on the part of the implicated defense counsel.' 94 Conduct such
as this, as well as the release of names of participants in the IHT process on
insurgent websites, such as www.albasrah.net, called into question the pro-
fessionalism of certain members of the retained defense teams. 95 It also
revealed the extent to which particular private defense attorneys were will-
ing to compromise their integrity as part of their efforts to discredit the
prosecution. Most importantly, this conduct greatly contributed to the
breakdown of trust between the court itself and the private defense bar such
that the court ceased to take private defense counsel seriously.
HRW's criticism that the IHT Defense Office attorneys were not
robust in their questioning is also true. 196 Fortunately, the Defense Law Ad-
viser worked increasingly close with the IHT Defense Office attorneys so
that the level of cross-examination (although not perfect) improved during
the course of the Ad-Dujayl trial and (as already noted) it is hoped that the
Defense Law Adviser is able to impress upon the IHT Defense Office the
need for increased professionalism through training, review of their work,
193 See Transcript of Record at 21-29, al-Dujail Trial, (June 12, 2006) (No. 2).
194 See HRW Report, supra note 8, at 71.
195 See A1-Mahkama al-Jina'iya al-'Iraqiya al-'Uliya [The Iraqi High Criminal Court], al-
Dujail Opinion, available at http://www.iraq-iht.org/ar/doc/finalcour.pdf, translated in
Grotian Moment: The Saddam Hussein Trial Blog, English Translation of the Dujail Judg-
ment, Dec. 2006, pt. 1, 26, http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/dujail/opinion.asp.
196 HRW Report, supra note 8, at 71-72.
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and other measures that are ongoing. Notably, the one defendant acquitted
of all charges, Mohammad Azzawi, was represented by an IHT Defense
Office attorney throughout the course of the Ad-Duj ayl trial.
E. Judicial Turnover and Judicial Temperament Negatively Impacted
the Ad-Dujayl Trial
HRW's criticisms of the Ad-Dujayl trial because of the repeated
turnover of sitting judges are accurate.1 97 Judicial turnover occurred for
many reasons including resignation, political interference, illness, and per-
ceived conflicts of interest. This meant that, whenever a permanent judge
was absent, the HIT was required to place an alternate judge (who had re-
viewed the Ad-Dujayl investigative dossier and who followed the proceed-
ings each day via closed circuit television in the robing room of the IHT) on
Trial Chamber 1.
This procedure initially permitted the trial to move forward without
any prejudice to the defendants. This is so because the IHT had at least two
alternate judges who were fully versed in the Ad-Dujayl trial. As judicial
turn-over continued, the IHT president was forced to appoint new alternate
judges (who had no experience with the trial) to sit in for judges who were
not present. The impact of this judicial turn-over certainly impacted the
course of the Ad-Dujayl trial in multiple ways and is a critical component of
HRW's analysis that bears further study to ensure that similar problems do
not arise with other trials before the 1HT.
HRW also criticized the judicial demeanor of Judge Ra'ouf Abdul
Rahman as undermining the "appearance of impartiality" of the Ad-Dujayl
trial. 198 This criticism is unwarranted as Judge Ra'ouf's temperament did
not impact the fairness of the Ad-Dujayl trial.
By way of background, Judge Ra'ouf Abdul Rahman was com-
pelled to stand in for Judge Sa'eed al-Hamash after Judge Sa'eed was trans-
ferred to another judicial chamber as a result of interference in the IHT's
activities by Iraq's Higher National Commission for De-Ba'athification
(HNCD) 199 and after Judge Rizgar resigned because of public criticism
197 Id. at 6"-5.
198 Id. at 66.
199 See supra note 64 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 214-18 and accompany-
ing text. The HNCD was established during the tenure of the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA) and is charged with removing from public employment former members of the Ba'ath
Party who held the rank of Regional Command Member, Branch Member, Section Member,
or Group Member. See Coalition Provisional Authority Memorandum No. 7, CPA/MEM/4
Nov 2003/7, § 1, available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20031104_CPAM
EM0_7_Delegation of Authority.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2007); see also CPA/ORD/16
May 2003/01, § 1(2), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030516_
CPAORD_IDe-Baathification of IraqiSociety_.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2007). The
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about his complacent demeanor towards the defendants.200 At this time, the
defendants and defense counsel themselves were proving difficult to control
and, almost daily, attempted to hijack the courtroom with political speeches,
threats of violence towards people in the courtroom, boycott demands, and
other types of disruptive behavior. Thus, Judge Ra'ouf stepped into a vola-
tile courtroom in which the defendants were unruly and in which any ap-
pearance of leniency towards the defendants resulted in stinging public
criticism.
On the very first day that Judge Ra'ouf sat on the Ad-Dujayl trial,
he attempted to exert a level of control over the courtroom that Judge Rizgar
had failed to provide. 0' When court convened that day, the defendants and
defense counsel hurled insults at Judge Ra'ouf and refused to obey his or-
ders. In accordance with Iraqi law, Judge Ra'ouf simply ejected the defen-
dants and defense attorneys who were recalcitrant, appointed substitute
counsel, and moved forward with trial.202 The message this sent to all in-
volved with the trial was clear-the court was in control and would not tol-
erate anything other than the careful weighing of evidence.
As the defendants and defense counsel intermittently misbehaved or
engaged in periodic outbursts, Judge Ra'ouf usually (but not always) erred
on the side of caution and restraint. For example, on one notable day of trial,
Barzan al-Tikriti appeared wearing only his pajamas.2 3 He proceeded to
insult the court by calling Judge Ra'ouf (whose name means kindness in
Arabic) neither "merciful nor forgiving.' '204 He then refused to recognize the
court's authority and stubbornly rose from his seat, sat on the courtroom
floor with his back to the judge, and remained there over the objection of
the prosecution and other participants in the court.205 Judge Ra'ouf (instead
Iraqi Government ratified the creation of the HNCD and embedded its operation in Iraq's
Constitution. See IRAQI CONST. art. 135 (stating that the HNCD "shall continue its function
as an independent commission, in coordination with the judicial authority and the executive
institutions within the framework of the laws regulating its functions").
200 See supra note 64 and accompanying text; see also infra note 227 and accompanying
text.
201 See Worth, supra note 65, at A13.
202 See e.g., id. (stating that "the new chief judge order[ed] all four lead defendants re-
moved from the courtroom--one of them kicking and screaming as he went"); see also Law
on Criminal Proceedings With Amendments, No. 23, 158 (1971), available at
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/Iraqi Criminal-Procedure Code.pdf (stat-
ing that the "defendant may not be removed from the court room.. . unless he violates the
rules of the court, in which case procedures continue as if he were present").
203 See Hamza Hendawi, Saddam Back in Court, Lashes out at President, A.P., Feb. 13,
2006 (observing that Barzan al-Tikriti attended court in a "white undershirt and long, brown
underwear").
204 Transcript of Record at 2, al-Dujail Trial, (Feb. 13, 2006) (No. 1).
205 Robert F. Worth, Prosecutors of Hussein Press Charges of Execution, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
14, 2006, at A8 (stating that Barzan al-Tikriti "was dragged out kicking and screaming after
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of growing irate and ejecting Barzan al-Tikriti, as would have occurred in
almost any other court) simply proceeded forward with the trial with the
defendant's back to him.2°6
This patience and professionalism was reflected at other points in
the trial-such as when the defense counsel (as already described) repeat-
edly revised witness lists during the course of the defense case in violation
of the IHT Rules of Evidence and Procedure. 207 For approximately two
weeks, Judge Ra'ouf continued to accept these revised witness lists and
whatever witnesses the defense brought to court without censure when he
could have (according to law) simply halted the defense case unilaterally as
a result of the defense attorneys' failure to comply with the rules.208 Of
course, there were moments in which Judge Ra'ouf did lose his temper and
respond to insults (either actual or perceived) hurled at him from the defen-
dants or the defense bar, but these moments were the exception and not the
general rule.
HRW criticizes Judge Ra'ouf's behavior as erratic, using as one ex-
ample an event that occurred at trial on May 24, 2006.209 On that day, Judge
Ra'ouf refused to allow defense lawyers to direct any questions to defense
witness Tariq Aziz.21° Judge Ra'ouf's initial reason for doing this, stemmed
from his anger over the fact that each of the defendants had already ques-
tioned Tariq Aziz and provided long speeches that intermittently focused on
evidence before the court while also insulting it. Thus, when the defense
attorneys wished to continue questioning Tariq Aziz, Judge Ra'ouf cut them
off stating:
Your defense is mainly building on insults to the members of the court,
and defaming the court. You do not have a defense plan. Defamation of
his last courtroom appearance, complained repeatedly about his treatment, and at one point
sat down on the floor, facing away from the judge, and appeared to fall asleep").
206 See id.
207 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
208 See IHT R. EVID. & P. 41(1)(D); see also supra note 130 and accompanying text.
209 HRW Report, supra note 8, at 67.
210 Tariq Aziz provided testimony justifying Saddam Hussein's reprisals against the civil-
ian population of Ad-Dujayl as a legitimate response to the failed assassination attempt
against him in 1982. See John F. Bums, Hussein's Former Envoy Gushes with Adulation on
the Witness Stand, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2006, at Al, A8. Tariq Aziz also stated that he dined
frequently with Barzan al-Tikriti "[slo if he was busy for a few days, killing and slaughtering
people in this case, he would have told me. Since he didn't, it's clear, he cannot have been
involved." Id. This testimony was largely irrelevant, and Tariq Aziz admitted that he had no
official or personal involvement with the events which took place in Ad-Dujayl after the
failed assassination attempt. See id.
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the court and its members [is] your only plan of defense. You have been
informed that the court will not give [you] more chances to ridicule [it]." I
When Judge Ra'ouf adjourned for lunch, he immediately reflected on this
decision, reconsidered, and permitted the defense counsel to question Tariq
Aziz, despite the fact that Judge Ra'ouf felt the evidence Tariq Aziz had
presented was mostly irrelevant and the defendants (who had already ques-
tioned Tariq Aziz) had insulted the court and used their time to speak about
matters extraneous to the Ad-Dujayl case. This willingness to reconsider
rulings, with a view towards getting them right, should be applauded rather
than criticized.
F. Trial Chamber 1 Lacked Political Independence
HRW alleges that various organs of the Iraqi government interfered
with the ongoing Ad-Dujayl trial such that the court's independence was
compromised.2 2 This charge is the most serious charge levied against the
entire HIT process and has substantial merit. The first type of interference
catalogued in the HRW Report came about because of the Iraqi govern-
ment's ability to utilize loopholes in the IHT Statute to inject itself directly
into the IHT process. The second type of interference was indirect and in-
volved members of the Iraqi government, or more generally, Iraq's civil
society publicly criticizing the IHT process, individual judges involved with
the Ad-Dujayl trial, or the defendants. This section of the article will ad-
dress each of these types of interference.
1. Political Interference
An example of this first type of interference can be found in the
manner in which Iraq's Higher National Commission for De-Ba'athification
(HNCD) 213 utilized Article 33 (which prohibits any members of Iraq's for-
mer Ba'ath Party from serving on the Tribunal) of the HIT Statute to replace
sitting judges on the IHT.2 4 The HNCD repeatedly levied accusations of
Ba'ath Party membership against multiple judges and prosecutors without
providing any evidence to the accused and despite the fact that the HNCD
lacked jurisdiction to enforce Article 33 against the IHT.2t 5 Although, it was
211 Transcript of Record at 81, al-Dujail Trial, (May 24, 2006) (No. 1).
212 See HRW Report, supra note 8, at 38.
213 See supra note 199.
214 See Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal art. 33 ("No person who was previously a mem-
ber of the disbanded Ba'ath Party may be appointed as a judge, investigative Judge, public
prosecutor, an employee or any of the personnel of the Court.").
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never completely clear who was directing the activities of the HNCD, this
"committee" was obviously a tool of some person, persons, or group to in-
terfere with the IHT. A notable target of the HNCD during the Ad-Dujayl
trial was Judge Sa'eed al Hamash-the original Deputy Presiding Judge of
Trial Chamber 1.
In a troubling display of the HNCD's ability to use Article 33 to
impact the Ad-Dujayl trial, Judge Sa'eed was reassigned to an alternate trial
chamber upon the IHT's receipt of allegations of Ba'ath Party membership
from the HNCD.216 The timing of these HNCD allegations were disturbing
in that they were levied against Judge Sa'eed two days after he became the
acting presiding judge (after the resignation of Judge Rizgar) of Trial
Chamber 1 and after more than two years of service on the court.217 And it
was only because of the HNCD's interference with the IHT process that
Judge Ra'ouf Abdul Rahman became the presiding judge of Trial Chamber
1.218
The Iraqi government also demonstrated that Article 4(4) of the
IHT Statute could be used as a tool to intervene in the IHT process. Article
4(4) permits the "Presidency Council in accordance with a proposal from
the Council of Ministers . . . [to] transfer Judges and Public Prosecutors
from the Court to the Higher Judicial Council for any reason., 21 9 HRW's
Report notes that this provision was used to remove the presiding judge of
the Anfal trial (as opposed to the Ad-Dujayl trial) for comments he made on
September 14, 2006 and beforehand that executive branch officials and oth-
ers such as the IHT president and the chief prosecutor of the Anfal trial
220
215 Although the HNCD is generally charged with removing the upper four levels of the
Ba'ath Party from public employment in Iraq; it has no jurisdiction over the IHT. See id The
reason for this is that the IHT is an independent entity within the Iraqi government that is not
subordinate to any other government entities. See IRAQI CONST. art. 131 (stating that the IHT
will "continue its duties as an independent judicial body, in examining the crimes of the
defunct dictatorial regime and its symbols"); see also Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal art.
1(1) (stating that the IHT enjoys complete independence from the Iraqi government). Be-
cause the IHT is independent, it has its own self-contained de-ba'athification provision in
Article 33 which the IHT itself is obligated to police. See id. art. 33. Although the HNCD has
acknowledged in writing that it lacks jurisdiction to remove judges and prosecutors from the
IHT, it sometimes files charges against members of the IHT. See supra note 64.
216 See supra note 64.
217 See id.
28 See id.
219 Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal art. 4(4).
220 For example, on September 13, 2006, the chief prosecutor of the Anfal trial requested
that Judge Abdullah resign because of alleged bias towards Saddam Hussein. Timeline: Anfal
Trial, BBC NEWS, Jan. 8, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle._east/5272224.stm (last
visited Apr. 24, 2007). The next day, the Chief Judge responded to a statement from Saddam
Hussein by telling him that he "was not a dictator." Id.
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interpreted as demonstrating leniency towards Saddam Hussein.221 The in-
volvement of the executive branch in the removal of Judge Abdullah, which
is documented in HRW's Report, is yet another example of how politicians
used poorly drafted provisions of the IHT Statute to interfere with the IHT
process and to fundamentally tamper with ongoing judicial proceedings.
The impact of such tampering directly altered the course of both the
Ad-Dujayl and Anfal trials in ways that are difficult to ascertain and must
not be countenanced. In order to ensure that such interference does not con-
tinue to occur, the Iraqi National Assembly should amend Article 33 and
Article 4(4) of the IHT Statute. More specifically, the Iraqi National As-
sembly should alter Article 33 of the IHT Statute so that it prohibits only the
four highest levels of the Ba'ath Party from serving on the IHT.222 Modify-
ing the IHT Statute in this manner will eliminate the disparity between the
de-Ba'athification provisions in the IHT Statute (which prohibits any mem-
bers of the Ba'ath Party from serving on the IHT) and the lower standard
contained in Iraq's national de-Ba'athification law (which prohibits only the
upper four levels of the Ba'ath party from maintaining a position in Iraq's
regular government). This, in turn, will remove any threat of de-
Ba'athification from either the IHT itself or the HNCD against long-
standing and respected members of Iraq's judiciary serving on the IHT who
may have joined the Ba'ath Party as a requirement to enter Iraq's judiciary
but never actively pursued Ba'ath ideals or goals during their career.
Likewise, Iraq's National Assembly should modify Article 4(4) of
the IHT Statute to clarify the role of the Council of Ministers and Presi-
dency Council in transferring judges from the 1HT to the Supreme Judicial
Council. As currently drafted, Article 4(4) can be read in two ways.
One may read Article 4(4) in conjunction with Article 4(5) to con-
clude that Article 4(4) is simply an administrative mechanism by which the
Council of Ministers and Presidency Council can remove judges for reasons
that do not relate to performance. The reason for this is that Article 4(5) of
the IHT Statute 223-as opposed to Article 4(4) which contains no such lan-
guage-is the only provision that sets forth parameters to remove a judge or
prosecutor for misconduct. If Article 4(5) is the only provision that permits
a judge to be removed for misconduct or performance related reasons, then
Article 4(4) cannot be used to remove a judge for performance related rea-
sons. If one accepts this line of interpretation then Article 4(4), no matter
221 HRW Report, supra note 8, at 40; see also Paul von Zielbauer, Judge Tells Hussein,
'You are Not a Dictator', N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2006, at A6; Richard A. Oppel Jr., After
Remark, Judge in Trial of Hussein Loses His Post, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2006, at A10.
222 See supra note 215.
223 See Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal art. 4(5) (stating that "[t]he term of service of a
judge or prosecutor ... shall end ... [i]f he is convicted of a non-political felony. If he pre-
sents false information. [Or] [i]f he fails to perform his duties without a legitimate reason."
[Vol. 39:99
JUDGING HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
how broad its language, cannot be read to grant the Council of Ministers
and Presidency Council the power to remove a judge or prosecutor for
cause.
Unfortunately, the Iraqi government continues to reject this view.
The Iraqi government interprets Article 4(4) as permitting it to remove
judges for any reason whatsoever-including misconduct or poor perform-
ance. This position renders Article 4(5) superfluous and violates a basic
canon of statutory interpretation which requires one to interpret all provi-
sions in a statute so that each provision has meaning. Even worse is the
broad language contained in Article (4) that the Iraqi government relies
upon to support its view that it can remove any IHT judge or prosecutor for
any reason whatsoever. Article 4(4) states expressly that the Council of
Ministers and Presidency Council may transfer judges and prosecutors from
the IT "for any reason. ' 24 This language certainly grants the Council of
Ministers and Presidency Council a colorable claim to exert power over the
IHT and to remove sitting judges (even during trial) citing poor perform-
ance if political aims so dictate.
Such power is a direct threat to the independence of any member of
the IHT-particularly in light of how the Iraqi government ignored Article
4(5) and utilized Article 4(4) to remove Judge Abdullah from the Anfal
trial225 and in light of the Iraqi government's expressed desire for the IHT to
treat many defendants before the IHT harshly. 6 To ensure that the Iraqi
government is stripped of the power to wield Article 4(4) in a manner that
compromises further the integrity of the IHT, the National Assembly of Iraq
should amend it to state something to the effect that the "Presidency Coun-
cil, upon a recommendation from the Council of Ministers, may transfer
judges and prosecutors from the tribunal to the Supreme Judicial Council,
only upon resignation from the IHT, dissolution of the IHT, or termination
from the IHT in accordance with Article 4(5)."
2. Indirect Political Interference
The second type of interference catalogued in HRW's Report is in-
direct in nature and consequently more difficult to remedy. It pertains to the
issuance of public statements by members of Iraq's government to the me-
dia about the conduct of trial and the demeanor of those participating in the
IHT process. Judge Rizgar Amin (the original presiding judge of the Ad-
Dujayl trial) resigned from the Ad-Dujayl trial because of stinging criticism
224 See id. art. 4(4).
225 See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
226 See infra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
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he received from various sections of Iraq's government in the media.227
Iraq's then Minister of Justice called Judge Rizgar incompetent and accused
him of making multiple errors during the course of the Ad-Dujayl trial.228 A
legal committee loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr229 issued at least one letter di-
rectly to Judge Rizgar Amin accusing him of failing to manage the JHT in
accordance with law and demanding that he resign. 230 And representatives
from the prime minister's office and various members of Iraq's parliament
denounced Judge Rizgar as weak and inept.23' The then-president of the
IHT and other sectors of Iraq's government compounded these pressures
further by failing to issue any statements of support in favor of Judge
2217 See Robert F. Worth, Fed Up Judge in Hussein Trial Offers to Quit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
15, 2006, at A6 (stating that Judge Rizgar Amin submitted his letter of resignation as chief
judge in Saddam Hussein's trial because he was frustrated with the IHT's failure to defend
him against widespread criticism); see also Nazhad Khasraw Hawramany, Iraqi Kurdistan:
Exclusive Interview with Judge Rizgar Hama Amin (Sept. 11, 2006) http:/iraqikurdistan.
blogspot.com/2006/09/exclusive-interview-with-judge-rizgar.html (stating that Judge Rizgar
resigned mainly because of the "unprecedented harsh criticism" levied against him by vari-
ous Shiite politicians and Shiite media outlets).
228 See HRW Report, supra note 8, at 41.
229 Muqtada al-Sadr is a young Shiite cleric who controls one of the largest and most vio-
lent militias in Iraq-Jaysh al-Mahdi. See International Crisis Group, Iraq's Muqtada Al-
Sadr: Spoiler Stabiliser?, Middle East Report N°55, Jul. 11, 2006, at i; see also John F.
Bums & Sabrina Tavernise, In Baghdad, Bush Policy Is Met with Resentment, N.Y. TIMEs,
Jan. 12, 2007, at Al (describing Jaysh al-Mahdi as the "most powerful of the Shiite mili-
tias"). In April of 2003, he allegedly ordered the murder of a respected Shiite cleric, Abdul
Majid al-Khoei, who had returned to Iraq to assist with reconstruction. See Robert F. Worth
& Edward Wong, Younger Clerics Showing Power in Iraq' Unrest, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26,
2006, at Al, A10. In response, an Iraqi judge issued a warrant for Muqtada al-Sadr's arrest
but the warrant was never executed. See id; see also John F. Bums, US. Seeks Arrest of
Shiite Cleric, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2004, at Al. In April of 2004, fighting broke out between
Coalition Forces and followers of Muqtada al-Sadr shortly after Ambassador L. Paul Bremer
shut down a newspaper that loyalists of Sadr published. See Jeffrey Gettleman, At Word of
U.S. Foray, a Baghdad Militia Erupts, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 7, 2004, at Al; see International
Crisis Group, supra note 229, at 11. The newspaper was accused of inciting violence. See
Jeffrey Gettleman, A Young Radical's Anti-U.S. Wrath is Unleashed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5,
2006, at Al, A8 ("Last week, the American authorities shut down Mr. Sadr's newspaper, Al
Hawza, after they accused it of inciting violence."). After a brief truce, fighting again broke
out between Coalition Forces and Muqtada al-Sadr in August of 2004. See John F. Bums,
Iraq Chief Gives 'Final Warning' to Rebel Cleric, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 20, 2004, at Al (de-
scribing two weeks of battles between Coalition Forces and forces loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr).
After intense combat, primarily centered in Najaf, Muqtada al-Sadr signed a ceasefire and
joined Iraq's political process. See International Crisis Group, supra note 229, at 14.
230 See Iraq Tries to Convince Saddam Judge to Stay, Reuters, Jan. 15, 2006 (stating the
Judge Rizgar Amin was reluctant to remain on the IHT because Shiite leaders had criticized
him for being "soft" on Saddam in court and that "the last straw ... was a lettpr criticizing
his handling of the trial from radical Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr").
231 See HRW Report, supra note 8, at 41.
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Rizgar's actions or, more generally, to issue any public rebuke to the Iraqi
government for attempting to influence Judge Rizgar's judicial demeanor.
Equally correct is HRW's criticism that senior government officials
ran "the risk of appearing to or actually seeking to influence the outcome of
trial" by issuing public statements that derided the defendants themselves.232
The catalogue of public statements listed in the HRW Report is both accu-
rate and unsettling.233 Whether statements from high ranking government
officials to the effect that "Saddam Hussein is a war criminal and he de-
serves to be executed 20 times a day for his crimes against humanity" or
that Saddam Hussein "kill[ed] 64 members of my family [and] deserves 64
executions, 234 directly impacted the judicial process is difficult to gauge. At
a minimum, however, it certainly contributed to an environment in which
the appearance of a fair trial and the defendants' guarantee of the right to be
presumed innocent were compromised. The Iraqi government should refrain
from making such pronouncements about the guilt or innocence of a par-
ticular defendant or the demeanor of members of the IHT's judiciary during
the course of trials so that judges are free to accord each defendant the full
panoply of rights given to someone presumed innocent until proven guilty
and so that the fairness of trials before the IHT is better protected.
IV. SUBSTANTIVE CONCERNS WITH THE IHT
HRW asserts that the IHT failed to provide any clear evidence
"concerning the structure, internal organization, and past practice of the
Ba'athist government security and political apparatuses ... to fill the gaps
and show the links between the 'crime-base' and the leadership" of the for-
mer regime. 235 HRW's concern that the IHT could not adequately determine
each defendant's liability without introducing evidence about the legal and
practical authority of the various security organizations and political institu-
tions implicated in the events at Ad-Dujayl, the structures of command and
internal organizations of these institutions, their internal reporting lines,
general context of human rights practices and use of violence, and the na-
ture of the relationship between the former regime's political institutions
(such as the Office of the President and the Revolutionary Command Coun-
cil) and legal institutions (such as the Revolutionary Command Council
Court)236 is not entirely correct.
Included in the investigative dossier and introduced at trial were
several statements from various witnesses such as the former head of the
232 See id. at 42.
233 Id. at 42-43.
234 Id. at 42, n.159.
235 Id. at 78.
236 See id. at 80-81.
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Presidential Diwan, Ahmed Hussein Samarra'i,137 who provided detailed
information about the relationship between the Presidential Diwan and the
Revolutionary Command Council Court and Hassan A1-Obeidi, a former
administrative head of the Mukhabarrat,238 who described the investigative
powers of the intelligence head and the nature of the intelligence agency's
relationship with Iraq's judicial and legal departments. This testimony, al-
though helpful in providing some information about the workings of the
former regime, was also supplemented by statements of the defendants
themselves in which they acknowledged having directly ordered subordi-
nates to engage in mass arrests or the destruction of Ad-Dujayl's orchards.
In addition, the IHT relied upon legal texts (cited in trial chamber and ap-
pellate chamber opinions) which set forth the authorities of various agencies
in order to discern internal reporting lines and to impose liability on various
defendants for their actions.239
The reality, however, is that the Ad-Dujayl trial did not exhaus-
tively examine the overall bureaucracy of the former regime or explain how
the specific components of the regime (or the defendants therein) carried out
the widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population of Ad-
Dujayl. Indeed, a substantive criticism of the Ad-Dujayl trial judgment can
be found in the manner in which the trial chamber imposed liability on three
local residents from Ad-Dujayl for the crimes against humanity of murder
and torture despite any evidence indicating that they directly engaged in
these activities.
For example, during the course of trial, it became clear that Mizhir
Roweed had actively identified individuals to the Mukhabarrat for interro-
gation, arrest, and imprisonment after the failed assassination attempt
against Saddam Hussein.240 This alone would have been enough to convict
Mizhir Roweed for direct participation in the crime against humanity of
imprisonment provided that he knew that his actions in pointing out indi-
237 See Worth, supra note 205.
238 See id.
239 See, e.g., al-Hay'a al-Tamyiziya, al-Mahkama al-Jina'iya al-'Iraqiya al-'Uliya [Cass-
ation Panel, Iraqi High Criminal Court], al-Dujail Final Opinion, available at
http://www.iraq-iht.org/ar/doc/ihtdf.pdf, translated in Grotian Moment: The Saddam Hussein
Trial Blog, Unofficial English Translation of the Dujail Trial IHT Appellate Chamber Opin-
ion, 16 (Dec. 26, 2006), http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/20070103_dujail_
appellate chamber opinion.pdf (citing, in part, Revolutionary Command Council Decision
No. 1563, which outlined the legal authorities of the Popular Army, the Popular Army's
chain of command, and the authorities of its head, to justify increasing the sentence that the
trial chamber originally issued against Taha Yaseen Ramadan).
240 See A1-Mahkama al-Jina'iya al-'Iraqiya al-'Uliya [The Iraqi High Criminal Court], al-
Dujail Opinion, available at http://www.iraq-iht.org/ar/doc/finalcour.pdf, translated in
Grotian Moment: The Saddam Hussein Trial Blog, English Translation of the Dujail Judg-
ment, Dec. 2006, pt. 6, 42-44, http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/dujail/opinion.asp.
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viduals for arrest were part of the regime's deliberate attack against the
town of Ad-Dujayl.
But Trial Chamber 1 went further. It convicted Mizhir Roweed and
two other similarly situated defendants, in part, for crimes against humanity
of murder and torture even though their actions had not directly harmed
241anyone from Ad-Dujayl. In imposing liability, the trial chamber opined
simply that it must have been foreseeable to Mizhir Roweed (as a result of
his witnessing the attacks on the town immediately after the failed assassi-
nation attempt and "in light of the control of the former Ba'ath regime of
the authority in Iraq, and especially if the accusation is attempting to kill the
head of the party") that the regime would torture and kill those whom he
helped arrest.2 42 This may have been true but the facts needed to infer such a
mens rea on the part of Mizhir Roweed could have been supplied with sig-
nificant expert testimony and other data that described how the former re-
gime's security apparatus functioned (including the regime's widespread
use of murder and torture as a tool to maintain security) and the role of in-
formants in that regime. Absent such testimony and its detailed analysis by
Trial Chamber 1, the conviction of Mizhir Roweed and similarly situated
defendants for the crime against humanity of murder and torture remains
legally tenuous.
Whether the IHT introduces more evidence of this type in the Anfal
trial is speculative, but the referral file does contain significant information
with regard to command and control of various units responsible for the
atrocities there. And the IHT would do much in terms of increasing the
merit of its cases if it devotes more resources towards the development of
such evidence.
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article is to correct multiple factual and legal
inaccuracies in HRW's Report so that it can improve, like the IHT, in its
critically important work. Without independent monitors holding the Iraqi
government and IHT to the standards applicable to any functioning judici-
ary, a vital aspect of the IHT process would be lost. Moreover, the fact that
HRW's Report contains multiple factual and legal errors does not necessar-
ily undermine the Report's overall conclusions with regard to changes that
should be made to the IHT process or with regard to whether the IHT proc-
ess met international standards. In fact, the author agrees with many of
HRW's criticisms and, where this has been the case, has noted in the text of
the article.
241 See id. at 51-52.
242 See id. at 43.
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As to whether the IHT process ultimately comported with interna-
tional standards, several important and highly troubling developments have
arisen since the Report's issuance that may further undermine any claim that
the IHT process was fair-(l) the appellate chamber's rapid affirmation of
the trial chamber decision; (2) the appellate chamber's decision to increase
the sentence of Taha Yaseen Ramadan from life to death; (3) the Iraqi gov-
emment's equally rapid decision to implement the death sentence against
Saddam Hussein, Barzan al-Tikriti, Awad al-Bandar, and Taha Yaseen
Ramadan; and (4) the grossly sectarian manner in which Saddam Hussein's
execution was implemented. Whether these events overshadow the difficult
work of all who hoped and sacrificed for a fair and transparent Ad-Dujayl
trial is a difficult question to ask. It is also a question that is unlikely to be
answered fully until a more complete record of all that transpired before the
IHT is open for historical examination.
